CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 January 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

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The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 666th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament and the first part of the 1994 session.

It is an honour for me to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of France at the start of this session. I shall spare no effort to serve the interests of the Conference. I will ensure that each and everybody's position is respected. I shall need the cooperation of everybody.

I welcome the presence of Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky for the first time as Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. We are convinced that he will be able to place his wealth of experience at the service of the Conference. He, and we with him, will be fortunate in being able to rely on the great competence and wholehearted devotion of the new Deputy Secretary-General, our friend Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. A special thought goes to Ambassador Vincente Berasategui, who discharged his duties as Secretary-General of the Conference with very great distinction.

I am glad to welcome the Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, who will be addressing us during this meeting.

I would like to welcome the new colleagues who have taken up their posts as representatives to the Conference - Mr. Ibrahim Omar of Ethiopia, Mr. Meghlaoui of Algeria, Mr. Tarre Murzi of Venezuela, Mr. Vattani of Italy and Mr. Sánchez Arnau of Argentina. I extend our best wishes to them and assure them of our full cooperation. Lastly, I would like to pay tribute to my predecessor, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, for the exemplary way in which he carried out his functions, and to Ambassador Tanaka of Japan, who as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban successfully conducted the consultations entrusted to him.

Those who, just a year ago, were worried about the future of the Conference on Disarmament were indeed mistaken. Following the conclusion of the Convention banning chemical weapons, the Conference embarked on its own reform. For the first time it started a substantive debate on transparency in armaments. In particular, for the first time since nuclear weapons appeared, it decided to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and soon, perhaps, a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Thus we see the proof that the Conference both reflects the international situation and acts as the instrument of the will of the international community. The cold war had halted its operations. The end of the East-West confrontation has cleared the log-jam in its work. However, it is not enough just to look on as progress is made. We must also be actively involved in change. Here I believe we have a twofold obligation. First of all to complete without delay work to expand the membership of the Conference. How can we justify the Conference's remaining a prisoner of outdated ideological formats now that international balances have undergone such profound change? Who can deny the need to include new States whose military

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capabilities and strategic roles correspond to today's concerns in the field of arms control and non-proliferation? We must reach agreement without delay on a new make-up for the Conference which will guarantee its representative nature and thus its legitimacy. It is my intention to appoint a new special coordinator to propose a rapid solution to this urgent question.

It is no less important to bring our agenda up to date. At the beginning of last year's session we adopted a pragmatic work programme which in no way prejudged our individual positions. This approach proved useful. Wisdom should lead us to adopt the same formula this year. But we also need to address ourselves seriously to the adaptation of our agenda to present-day realities. Here too the appointment of a special coordinator to look at this matter therefore seems to me essential.

In setting its objectives, in its working methods, in its very spirit, the Conference is a reflection of current international events. If we keep to the facts, we cannot but note that the present-day strategic situation is sending contradictory signals. On the one hand, there are some very positive developments: the end of the East-West confrontation, which the European countries are the first to welcome, because it has allowed many of them to recover their freedom and the power to control their own destinies, and it has allowed all of them to rediscover the ties which have been woven in the course of a long-common history. The implementation of a real process of disarmament, the results of which are already impressive: the INF Treaty, the START I and II agreements, the Treaty on Convention Forces in Europe, the Convention banning chemical weapons, the launching of negotiations on a nuclear-test-ban treaty, an agreement to negotiate a convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. In the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, faster progress is being made towards universality in the NPT. More than 15 States, including China and France, have recently acceded to the Treaty. Algeria and Argentina have just announced their intention to do so. Peace processes, in which the question of arms control plays a decisive role, have been initiated in several areas of tension: in Cambodia, and of course in the Middle East.

At the regional level, the conclusion of several agreements marking substantial progress in arms control. In Latin America, in Africa - where a denuclearization treaty is being drawn up - in south Asia, where confidence-building measures have been established between India and Pakistan.

On the other hand we cannot ignore the persistence and indeed the exacerbation of situations which threaten international security. Several serious conflicts have not yet been resolved, whether in Somalia, where United Nations intervention has not yet succeeded in restoring peace, Haiti, where democratic legitimacy has been flouted and violence continues, or Afghanistan, which is still torn by conflict - and of course the tragedy in Bosnia. At the same time, weapons are being built up in many regions of the world, particularly in Asia. Major nuclear capabilities remain, in Europe and throughout the world. It is particularly important not to ignore this since the stabilization of the former Soviet Union is still in doubt. Finally, in several regions there are continuing or worsening risks of proliferation of

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weapons of mass destruction: the discovery of the nuclear capabilities of Iraq, the potential consequences of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the refusal of North Korea to abide by its international commitments in the field of non-proliferation.

The recapitulation of these facts should prompt a number of reflections on the orientation of the work of the Conference, and indeed on the state of mind in which we must tackle our negotiations. First of all we must address ourselves seriously to the various items on our agenda. The question of security assurances to non-nuclear countries remains essential. Prerequisites exist to make it possible to harmonize the negative assurances already provided by the nuclear Powers. I do not think I am going too far if I say that there is room for progress on this important matter, which we have to consider in the light of both the end of the cold war and the new risks of proliferation.

The question of transparency in armaments is no less important. United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36 L gives the Conference on Disarmament a well-defined responsibility in expanding the Register on transfers of conventional arms and in extending the field of transparency to weapons of mass destruction and transfers of technology for military purposes. The Conference must therefore continue its efforts in order to make its own contribution.

Looking at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is time to move beyond the sterile confrontation of hard and fast positions. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Hoffmann of Germany, a shift towards the negotiation of confidence-building measures was noted in 1993. It is promising because it is realistic. Specific proposals were made last year They should be taken into account in 1994.

The question of a ban on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes will be on our agenda for the first time. As for nuclear tests, the clear aim of the convention is to help to combat nuclear-weapon proliferation. It is therefore essential for the future convention to be universal and internationally verifiable. That is why many delegations, including mine, believe that the Conference on Disarmament is the appropriate forum for dealing with this subject. However, consensus does not exist on this point. We must therefore rapidly clarify this aspect of the problem. It is my intention to designate without delay a special coordinator whose task it will be to gather the views of member States and identify guidelines for our future work.

Finally, this session sees the beginning of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Obviously a lot is at stake in these negotiations. They are beginning on the basis of a number of essential elements contained in the decision adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 10 August 1993, in resolution 48/70, adopted by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly, and in the future mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. We believe that these elements are the following. First, the fact that the treaty will need to be universal. All the countries with a nuclear

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capability will therefore have to be parties to it. This is essential for the treaty's entry into force. It is difficult to imagine the acknowledged nuclear Powers agreeing to new constraints if other countries remain free to develop clandestine nuclear armament programmes.

Secondly, the need for international verification. The treaty will also have to be internationally verifiable. Who would agree to join an agreement whose provisions could be easily breached? Who would accept the constraints of verification if there were no guarantees that it would be dependable and impartial?

Lastly, the need for truly multilateral negotiations. This is a precondition for universality. All the countries which are to accept restrictions under the treaty must be involved from the very outset in drafting it. Hence, I repeat once again, the urgent need to expand the membership in the Conference.

If we really wish to make progress on these various subjects, if we really wish to shoulder our responsibilities in the new international situation, we must bear in mind a few basic considerations. The first is that international security henceforth involves efforts shared by everybody and can no longer be based on the responsibility of just a few. However convenient such an assertion might have been, it is difficult to show today that the only threat to peace lies in the nuclear weapons possessed by the five nuclear Powers. It is just as difficult to deny that the build-up of conventional weapons and the development of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in regions of tension, constitute a real danger, first and foremost for the great majority of developing countries which suffer both pressure from powerful neighbours and restrictions on transfers of technology which result from the very risks of proliferation. This leads me to a second, no less important truth: that there is a clear link between the results of measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the continuation of the disarmament effort. It is difficult to see how the disarmament process could continue in a context of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The third consideration is that it is essential to comply with commitments undertaken. A sovereign country takes on international commitments, particularly in the field of security, only if it is convinced that the treaty it is signing is in keeping with its interests. But at the same time it must have an assurance that everything will be done to ensure that the Commitments undertaken by all parties will be respected by all parties, and that failure to comply will be sanctioned. For example, what would be the use of the efforts we are making to give the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons the universal character it deserves and to extend it in the best possible conditions, if at the same time it were to be shown that compliance with its provisions was not guaranteed? I am thinking in particular of North Korea: this case cannot, we feel, be viewed merely as a regional issue; because it has to do with respect for an international standard, it is of concern to all of us. Hence the new importance attached to verification regimes, as we can see in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The chemical weapons Convention and, soon, the

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nuclear-test-ban treaty or the convention banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. This leads us to a fourth and last fact: that a multilateral approach to disarmament and non-proliferation issues is increasingly indispensable. A rule of international security, if it is to be subscribed to by as many States as possible, if it is to be respected, has to be drawn up jointly and provide for collective means of implementation. The time is past when two super-Powers could negotiate a disarmament treaty between themselves and then submit it for endorsement by the international community. It is no affront to anyone to recognize this.

Each of us will have understood, in this recapitulation of a few truths, to what extent we view the Conference on Disarmament as being at the heart of these changes and these new approaches. Some had ventured to assert that, with the end of the cold war, disarmament was a thing of the past because it was supposed to be only an ideological instrument in the East-West confrontation. Events have given that idea the lie. The disarmament process has become a reality. In taking on substance, it has changed its nature and has become more rich in content: it covers weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons, it applies to the regional as well as the global level, it includes confidence-building measures as well as non-proliferation. In this context, the Conference on Disarmament has a strengthened role to play. Because of its specific status - its limited but representative membership, its position as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, the rule of consensus on which its operations rest - it can make a major contribution to the creation of a safer world. Provided that we have the will to do so, this is within our grasp.

The consultations I have held on organizational matters lead me to believe that we can certainly embark on substantive work very soon. When we have heard the speakers on the list for today in plenary, I will invite the Conference to consider rapidly in an informal meeting the steps to take in order to make progress in our work. In intend in particular to deal with the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for this session; the question of the President's statement on the agenda and the organization of the session; and lastly consideration of requests for participation in our work from non-member States of the Conference. Immediately afterwards we will resume the plenary for an official confirmation of the agreement among members of the Conference on these three subjects. In the next few days, I will be continuing my consultations with members on other pending organizational matters.

I would now like to invite Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to read the message sent to us by the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to thank you for your kind and generous words of welcome, and I wish to assure you and the members of the Conference of my determination and that of my collaborators in the secretariat to do our utmost to assist in your important work.

I shall now read to the Conference the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"It gives me great pleasure to send this message to the participants in this Conference as it opens its 1994 session.

"In my report entitled 'New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era', I stated that the changed international environment had created new opportunities for the pursuit of disarmament, while also posing new challenges. I also emphasized that the end of bipolarity had not diminished, but had rather increased, the need for disarmament. I said that the disarmament process should be seen as an integral part of preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

"In my report to the General Assembly last year on the work of the Organization in 1993, I spoke of the significant events that had taken place in the international security environment, and which required new responses and renewed efforts by the international community. I stressed that the momentum created by the many positive breakthroughs of the past year needed to be maintained.

"I also pointed out that notable among such achievements was the decision of your Conference to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That decision had been made possible by the crucial commitment of nuclear-weapon States to such a treaty. It represented a culmination of the efforts of the international community as a whole to bring about the long-cherished goal of the total prohibition of nuclear testing.

"The recently concluded session of the General Assembly further confirmed this positive trend towards the consolidation of the pattern of cooperation among Members of the United Nations in the vital sphere of security, arms limitation and disarmament, as exemplified by the growing number of resolutions adopted by consensus in this field. This will no doubt positively affect your deliberations and negotiations in the Conference. The resolution on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, sponsored by more than 157 Member States at the forty-eight session of the General Assembly, and adopted by consensus, is a milestone in the efforts of the international community to ban all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

"I am gratified that, pursuant to this resolution, and following consultations during the inter-sessional period, the Conference will now

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give priority to negotiations for a universal, multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would undoubtedly contribute effectively to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and, therefore, to the enhancement of international peace and security. It would also contribute greatly towards the successful outcome of the 1995 review and extension conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. I am sure that your Conference will seize the opportunity now before it achieves, as a matter of urgency, this long-sought goal of the international community.

"The Conference will also be giving priority to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, the best guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. However, unless this goal is realized, it is important for the international community to develop, in addition to the positive guarantees contained in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), effective measures or arrangements for negative security assurances as an essential element for an effective regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament should now take a fresh look at the question of negative security assurances in the light of the recent positive developments in the international scene. It should pursue this issue with renewed vigour.

"Further evidence of the importance attached by the international community to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects was the adoption by the General Assembly of a consensus resolution recommending the negotiation in the most appropriate international forum of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. I am aware of the complexity of this issue; I am confident, however, that the Conference will find the most appropriate arrangement to address it.

"Transparency in armaments has now become an important new focus of your endeavours. The establishment of the Register of Conventional Arms is an event of great importance. The potential of the Register as a confidence-building measure through increased openness and transparency in military matters cannot be overemphasized. I am pleased that more than 80 States, including most major arms suppliers and recipient States, have provided information to the Register in its first year of operation, thus making most of the world's trade in major conventional arms transparent. Later this year, a group of experts will be convened to consider the continued operation of the Register and its expansion: this might include the addition of further categories of equipment, and data on military holdings and procurement through national production. This would result in a far-reaching international confidence-building tool

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which could create unprecedented transparency both in the international arms trade and in the national production of arms. It could also culminate in the establishment of an early-warning system which would pave the way for the reduction of conventional armaments to the lowest possible level consistent with the principle of the legitimate security needs of States. I therefore urge you to continue to address this issue with determination, with a view to contributing to this goal, and thus to ensuring that disarmament and arms control play a major part in the efforts of the United Nations in the field of preventive diplomacy and peace-making.

"Your Conference has, over the years, done useful work on the issue of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The new international political environment suggests that the world community should seize the opportunity to ensure that space technology is effectively used to promote the security of all States. New ideas have been put forward, especially in the field of confidence-building measures. I urge you to explore these avenues further.

"The question of expansion of membership of the Conference has been on your agenda for a number of years. I hope that agreement will soon be reached to ensure that the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body better reflects the current geopolitical situation, and is able to meet the security challenges of the 1990s and the next century. This would also greatly facilitate your ongoing consultations on the review of the agenda of the Conference.

"The tasks ahead of your Conference are daunting. With the determination and commitment that have characterized your action during the last few years, I believe that they can be fulfilled.

"I wish you every success in your endeavours."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for passing on to us the message from Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. I would ask Mr. Petrovsky to be so kind as to inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of our appreciation for his contribution and the importance he attaches to our work.

The Secretary-General has also written to me transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session. The letter has been distributed as CD/1236.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Mexico, Sweden, the United States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I will afterwards give the floor to the Ambassador of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, who will present his report on his consultations. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Before reading a short message from my Government, allow me to extend a very warm welcome to the new Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and our new colleagues from Algeria, Argentina, Ethiopia, Italy and Venezuela. We wish their predecessors every success. We congratulate Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail for his very well-deserved appointment as Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. We are very pleased to have with us today the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. John Holum, and we wish him every success in his new and important task. We would like to thank Ambassador Mounir Zahran for the efforts he made during the Conference's inter-sessional period and we are very pleased to see you, Ambassador Errera, presiding over this initial stage of our annual session. Last year you helped to resolve various issues which enabled our work to get off to a smooth start and we are sure that something similar will be achieved this year. Indeed, we are sure that you and your delegation will continue to contribute to the search for disarmament measures that will bring about a world that is less armed and more secure for all. Now I wish to read the message from the Government of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament dated 25 January 1994.

"For decades the international community has been advocating the complete cessation of all nuclear testing. Both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly of the United Nations and other multilateral forums, Mexico has insisted upon the need to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race through the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT).

"In the General Assembly, Mexico has been one of the principal promoters of the 100-odd resolutions adopted on this item. Since the establishment of the Conference on Disarmament in 1962, Mexico has called for prompt agreement on a CTBT. In the light of the difficulties that emerged in the Conference, we explored another path, that of amending the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty.

"After more than 2,000 nuclear tests and 30 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, the Government of Mexico rejoices in the Conference on Disarmament's unanimous decision of 10 August last to undertake finally the negotiation of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear testing. That decision, which today we shall put into practice, was endorsed and strengthened by the General Assembly in its historic resolution 48/70 of 16 December 1993, which reflects the will of the entire international community to proceed quickly and expeditiously in the solution of this question of utmost importance for everyone. The Conference on Disarmament will now have to begin an intensive dialogue with a view to drafting without delay a CTBT whose prompt conclusion will send a political message of great significance. The Government of Mexico commits itself to contributing to the search for a text embracing compromise solutions that, in turn, will ensure that the treaty enjoys the widest possible adherence and that it is internationally and effectively verifiable."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and his kind words addressed to me and my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Norberg.

Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): Mr. President, I would like, first of all, to congratulate you upon your assumption of the Chair and to offer your delegation the full support of my delegation. I trust that under your able leadership we will have a good start to this session of the Conference on Disarmament and in particular that we will be able to make rapid progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. I also welcome the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Vladimir Petrovsky, and the Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail.

It is with great hope and satisfaction that I take the floor today, as there is now, at last, a consensus within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Conference will very soon, maybe already today, take a decision to establish an ad hoc committee with a clear mandate to negotiate such a treaty.

Sweden has on several occasions submitted treaty proposals for a multilateral text on a comprehensive test ban. A new draft treaty text, including a verification protocol, has now been presented and circulated in document CD/1232. It was presented by my delegation during informal consultations in the Ad Hoc Committee on 9 December last year. In producing the draft we consulted with many delegations and received many valuable comments, which we have taken into consideration. Today I have the honour to officially introduce the Swedish proposal in the plenary of the Conference.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will mainly serve two purposes, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Through START I and II as well as other agreements and unilateral decisions there is already a clear trend towards nuclear disarmament. A test-ban treaty is therefore primarily directed at non-proliferation. As is stated in the preamble of the proposed treaty text, a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests would be an important instrument in preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As to the scope of the proposed treaty, it includes a total ban on all nuclear explosions, i.e. also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. There is in the view of my delegation no practical use of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such explosions could on the contrary serve as a tool for developing nuclear weapons. When formulating the article on scope (article I), we have been guided by the wording of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which is also referred to in the preamble and which has served well for 30 years. Under the proposed text it is also prohibited to cause, encourage, assist in, permit or prepare nuclear explosions. My delegation is fully aware of the difficulty to define and verify preparations for a nuclear test. This element has, however, been included, as it is in our view logical in this context to include at least direct preparations leading up to a nuclear test.

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In the proposal it is suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, would be the "implementing agency", assigned, inter alia, the task of verification of compliance with the treaty. We have proposed IAEA since it seems reasonable to make use of an existing and viable organization active in the nuclear field, instead of establishing a new one. IAEA has long experience in international verification work and international cooperation involving sophisticated technologies, with particular experience regarding on-site inspection. Of course, new expertise has to be added to the Agency in areas relevant to CTB verification which are new to IAEA, for example in seismology and hydroacoustics. But at the same time it is to be expected that economic benefits stand to be gained from the fact that existing administrative and support resources within the organization could be used.

The verification system is outlined in a protocol to the draft treaty. The protocol is proposed as an integral part of the treaty. The intention is to create an efficient and cost-effective verification system that will give all parties an essentially equal possibility to satisfy their verification needs. The proposed verification system consists of a global monitoring system and on-site inspections. The core of the monitoring system would be a two-tier network of seismological stations, one called the Alpha network, established and operated by the Agency, and one called the Beta network, established and operated by the States parties. The seismic network would be complemented with networks of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere and hydroacoustic signals in the oceans.

From these stations vast flows of data would be received and processed by an international data centre to be established within the Agency. The centre would provide a useful service to the States parties by rapidly distributing the easily accessible results of the analysis for their final assessment. The parties may if they wish ask, through the Agency, for clarifications or further information from another party on whose territory an event has occurred. In cases of uncertainties repeated exchanges of information may take place. If the unclear situation still remains thereafter, a State party may address a request for an on-site inspection to the Director-General of IAEA, who shall bring the matter to the attention of the Board of Governors of the Agency. That body may decide to launch an on-site inspection, the decision to be taken with a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

An on-site inspection upon request, a sort of challenge inspection, is an important feature of the verification system. This is meant to be the ultimate means to verify compliance with the treaty, if uncertainties have not been removed through exchanges of information. Challenge inspections will, in our view, occur only on rare occasions. The rule for a two-thirds majority in the Board of Governors is meant to eliminate the possibilities of abuse. It is of importance to carry out an on-site inspection as soon as possible after the request is made. It is stipulated that the on-site inspection shall begin in no case later than seven days after the decision of the Board of Governors. The inspection team shall report to the Board of Governors. Decisions on the report shall be taken by the Board with a two-thirds majority. In case of non-compliance the Board shall report the findings to the Security Council of

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

the United Nations. It may be noted that if clear breaches of the treaty obligations occur, a State party may lodge a complaint directly with the Security Council.

A large number of high-yield chemical explosions are carried out each year all over the globe, mainly for mining purposes. Appropriate procedures are needed to handle these events so that they do not jeopardize confidence in the treaty. Therefore we propose that chemical explosions with a yield exceeding 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency 15 days in advance and that they may be subject to on-site observation by the Agency. Explosions with a yield of between 100 and 500 tons of TNT equivalent shall be notified to the Agency not later than seven days after the explosion. There will also be a possibility to establish declared sites for parties that regularly conduct large explosions, for example in a mine. A declared site shall be open to on-site observation by the Agency, which also may place recording equipment at the site.

Sweden, like many other countries, has actively worked for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty for several decades. The issue has been on the agenda of this Conference and its predecessors since the early 1960s. Until recently an agreement on a nuclear test ban has proved elusive. But times have changed. In the year 1987 47 nuclear tests were carried out. Since September 1992 only one nuclear test has taken place. The present moratoria on nuclear testing are conducive to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and contribute to a favourable atmosphere in the coming negotiations. Therefore, my Government urges all nuclear-weapon States to extend existing moratoria when they expire, and to declare a moratorium if they have not yet done so.

The Conference on Disarmament now has an historic opportunity to abolish nuclear testing for all time. The prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty have never been more favourable. The Swedish treaty proposal is aimed at facilitating the work of the Conference on a nuclear test ban. My delegation hopes that it may serve as a basis for the negotiations.

Let us now seize the opportunity and work energetically and rapidly to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty of unlimited duration equipped with a satisfactory verification system.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Mr. John Holum, Director of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. HOLUM (United States of America): Mr. President, on behalf of the United States, may I first wish you every success as you guide the work of this body to begin this important year? You will have the complete cooperation of the United States delegation. I also thank your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his wise and skilful performance of the challenging duties of President. I would also like to congratulate the new Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

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Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, and express our confidence that we will have with him the same close and productive relationship that we enjoyed with his predecessor.

This is my first opportunity to address a session of the Conference on Disarmament as the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This forum serves the cause of a safer and more stable world, and my presence here today reflects the commitment of the Clinton Administration to the goals of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Upon my confirmation in November, the President reiterated to me the high priority he personally gives to making concrete, rapid progress on strengthening international security through multilateral cooperation. The end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United States will do everything in its power to make the most of them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a message to the Conference from President Clinton:

"I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This Conference has several important items on its agenda as the 1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and it may assume others, such as a ban on fissile material production for nuclear explosive purposes. None is more important than the negotiation of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but crucial, objective is the Conference's top priority. It reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will support and supplement the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and will further constrain the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons.

"Regional instabilities, the end of the cold war, and the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons have created new and compelling circumstances to encourage progress in disarmament. Accordingly, I decided last July to extend the moratorium on the United States nuclear-weapons tests and committed the United States to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At the same time, I called on the other nuclear-weapon States to observe a testing moratorium, and I do so again today.

"I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the United States delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest time of a comprehensive test-ban treaty that will strengthen the security of all nations. You have my best wishes during this important Conference."

- and it is signed by President Bill Clinton of the United States.

The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing basis. Its membership covers every region of the globe and reflects a wide range of concerns and interests. We have all

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come to accept the CD as both a market-place of ideas and a place where nations get down to practical business and conclude the agreements that enhance international security.

The United States recognizes the importance of the CD as a multilateral arms control body, and we have consistently supported appropriate membership expansion. We do, however, insist that it is inappropriate to elevate the status in the CD of a State whose behaviour continues to be flagrantly opposed to the goals of the Organization. It is our hope that CD members will continue working together to forge a consensus on an acceptable membership package.

The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention vividly demonstrates how the constructive competition of ideas and the pursuit of diverse interests and concerns can produce achievements to benefit the entire international community. I congratulate you on that signal accomplishment. However, this is not the time to rest. There is much work to be done; the demands are immediate; and we have a unique opportunity to help shape the world constructively.

The end of the cold war actually has increased the need for arms control. There are new sources of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. Formerly contained ethnic tensions have emerged in areas where adversaries are all too ready to use violence as the instrument of first resort. Sadly, there is abundant evidence that we still live in a world where technology advances faster than human wisdom. Arms control can help us meet the challenge of bringing peace and stability to a troubled new world order. We can limit and reduce destabilizing military forces. We can prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. We can contribute to confidence and trust through greater transparency about our military activities, and doing these things is not a sign of weakness or of capitulation; it is a wise investment in the future and a sure way to underwrite all of our vital national interests.

Much is under way. Less than three weeks ago, the presidents of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the United States signed a statement that opens the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It provides for the transfer of all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia for their dismantlement, while recording agreement on compensation for Ukraine, previewing the security assurances that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom will provide Kiev once it accedes to the NPT and START I enters into force, and reiterating the United States commitment to assist in eliminating strategic systems on Ukrainian territory. This trilateral statement advances the interests of all three countries and of the international community in general. It will accelerate the entry into force and implementation of the strategic arms reduction Treaty, bolster the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and lead to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear weapons. Equally important, this agreement should help establish a

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pattern of stable political relationships. It can contribute to an environment in which democratic reform, economic vitality, and social harmony can be pursued without dangerous distraction.

Arms control and confidence-building efforts are being seriously pursued elsewhere at the regional level - including the working group on arms control and regional security created as part of the Middle East peace process, the new regional forum created by the Association of South-East Asian Nations, the historic progress on arms control and non-proliferation in Latir America, and the agreement in principle between India and Pakistan to establish a multilateral dialogue on regional security and non-proliferation. Similarly, we were encouraged when CSCE ministers decided last December in Rome to begin discussions in the Forum for Security Cooperation of possible arms control contributions for settling the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

Manifestly, the arms control negotiating tables are now located not only in the conference rooms of Washington and Moscow and the committee rooms here in Geneva, but also in Buenos Aires; in New Delhi and Islamabad; in Cairo and Tel Aviv; and in many other places around the globe. While the venues are varied, the objectives are closely linked. The CD has been the proving-ground of new ideas and has set in motion a new dynamic and a new spirit of international negotiations.

With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the major items of business that will occupy you in the days ahead. In the short time I have been here in Geneva, I have already sensed the great anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or CTBT. And we should be excited. A CTBT is long overdue. We are beginning the final steps of a journey of too many years.

Let me be clear at the outset: United States policy - announced by President Clinton on 3 July - is one of strong support for concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time. Now, in the aftermath of the cold war, a CTBT becomes even more important. It will be an important part of our efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and will place a major restraint on the nuclear-weapon States. The United States has been working hard - as have many of you - to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations. We were pleased to be able to co-sponsor the United Nations resolution supporting the objectives of a CTBT. Its acceptance by consensus provides a strong base from which to launch your negotiations. The consensus at the United Nations shows there is now virtually universal support for a CTBT. While the issues are complex, they are not beyond our immediate reach; we should be able to work out the essential elements of a treaty expeditiously. "At the earliest possible time" means just that. Obviously, no country can unilaterally set the pace, and we should avoid arbitrary deadlines, but I assure you that as compared to some past deliberations on this issue, the United States will be out front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our heels.

A CTBT will be fully successful only with the participation and support of the five nuclear-weapon States and with broad international adherence. The nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility to contribute to these

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negotiations, and you have our commitment that the United States will meet its responsibility. For the United States, a tangible demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our continuing moratorium on nuclear testing. In his message to you which I read a few minutes ago, the President has again urged the other nuclear-weapon States to refrain from testing.

With the end of the cold war, we have moved from a bipolar world to a multipolar world. The threat of nuclear proliferation remains, and with it the need to preserve the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the primary bulwark against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT reflects a broad consensus against nuclear proliferation. The Treaty also establishes a framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and regulating cooperation among States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. And it has proved an important instrument for enhancing the social and economic development of its members.

The United States welcomes the substantial progress made at the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Conference, including the decision to open its proceedings to observers from both non-party States and non-governmental organizations. The Prepcom reaffirmed the importance of consensus as its method of decision-making, and it agreed on the background documentation the parties will need from the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other organizations to support their work. The Prepcom also unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the presidency of the 1995 conference. The work of the Prepcom is all the more important because of the end to which it is directed. The United States is committed to make every effort to achieve the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. Without a stable and durable non-proliferation regime, which includes a strong NPT, further arms control methods will be jeopardized.

Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that the many benefits the NPT provides to its parties will remain available. By indefinite extension, the international community will send to would-be proliferators the clearest possible signal that their activities are not acceptable.

The threat of nuclear proliferation has diminished in some regions, such as Latin America and Africa. We need to ensure that for the future such regional security benefits provided by the NPT are not mortgaged by a decision to limit its extension. The full weight of the NPT membership behind a Treaty of unlimited duration would be a formidable political force for non-proliferation. Moreover, it would provide an essential foundation for building further on the historic measures already taken to limit, reduce, and dismantle nuclear-weapon systems.

Our objective of reshaping the nuclear contours of the post-cold-war security landscape does not end there. The successful implementation of the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the implementation of unilateral initiatives, such as reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic arms reduction agreements, including START I and START II, were significant contributions to the process of halting the spread

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of nuclear arms. Now we can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT extension, but also negotiations for a global agreement to prohibit further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in his address to the United Nations last September.

Such an agreement should be formally negotiated here in the CD. We were greatly encouraged by the consensus support at the United Nations for such a convention. A non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively verifiable fissile material production ban could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of certain non-NPT States under some measure of restraint for the first time. It would also halt the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in the five declared nuclear-weapon States.

Negative security assurances are also related to the cause of non-proliferation. We adhere to a policy that has been reiterated by several previous administrations, namely:

> "The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a State allied to a nuclear-weapon State or associated with a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining this attack."

As we have stated repeatedly in this forum, the United States is open to discussions on this issue.

We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons; but we can control them. We can limit their impact and their influence. Deep reductions in nuclear-weapons inventories, strengthened and extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a CTBT, a global ban on fissile material production, and other measures will alter fundamentally the role of nuclear weapons in the world of the twenty-first century. All these steps will contribute to the important goal we all share - a safer and more stable world.

The devastating destructive power of nuclear weapons and the dangers posed by other weapons of mass destruction demand that they remain high on our arms control agenda, but they cannot be the only items. Another crucial element of the arms control equation is conventional arms.

We are reminded daily that the end of the cold war has not by any means removed all conflict and danger from the world. Regional arms races and destabilizing accumulations of arms well beyond those realistically needed for defence are all too common. Reversing these trends is a global responsibility. We can help reduce the sources of tension that generate such accumulations. We must continue working to discourage the use of arms in resolving disputes.

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The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is a landmark in the reduction of conventional weapons. It serves as the foundation for a post-cold-war security architecture in Europe based on cooperation rather than confrontation. We look forward to its full implementation in 1995, and note with satisfaction that tens of thousands of items of equipment have already been destroyed.

The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote greater transparency about security matters. Transparency in turn fosters the greater confidence and trust upon which stable political relationships can rest. Last year the CD created an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments (TIA). As the first new committee established by the CD in a number of years, it demonstrated the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges of the post-cold-war era. It is important as well because it is the only item on your agenda that addresses the conventional arms challenge. I strongly encourage you to build on the very useful work begun in the TIA Ad Hoc Committee last year. I also recommend the ideas put forward last year by the United States to promote transparency regarding conventional arms.

Some object that we should instead pay even more attention to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver them. Let us discuss those concerns seriously, but let us not create yet another setting where we repeat ourselves endlessly to the point where other important business is neglected. If we slacken in our willingness to address the conventional weapons problems that first gave rise to the TIA initiative, we will not make much progress, and we will begin to slide away from our global conventional arms control objectives. Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva on conventional arms will have a significant impact on related efforts elsewhere. We share your pride in the successful initiation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms. The first year's experience with the Register was good - but not good enough. Eighty-two responses represent answers from less than half the United Nation's membership. We must do better; our goal should be universal participation, which your work here at the CD can encourage.

The United States also looks forward to the experts' meeting on these issues in New York next month. We will play an active part in moving their efforts to a successful conclusion.

Another conventional arms issue on which we have taken a first step relates to land-mines. These weapons continue to wreak havoc on civilian populations whether or not they are any longer in an active war zone. The United Nations has supported by consensus the United States-initiated resolution calling for a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines. We must now take the next step and make the global moratorium a reality. In doing so, we not only protect the futures of many innocent civilians, but we also draw attention to a range of problems long thought too difficult for arms control to solve.

This process will also be fortified by this year's experts' deliberations leading to a review conference on the Convention on weapons which may be

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deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Although not presently a party to this Convention, the United States will closely follow the progress of the conference as an observer, and the President intends to submit the Convention to the United States Senate this year for advice and consent to ratification.

These positive developments can mutually reinforce one another, forming a tide that can break down resistance to progress on the conventional arms control agenda. The CD should help swell that tide.

In my closing minutes, let me briefly touch on the other developments and other issues that are part of United States arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation efforts.

Despite the fact that the chemical weapons Convention has now passed beyond the CD's purview, I know that you remain keenly interested in its fate. In Washington this past November, President Clinton submitted the Convention to the United States Senate for advice and consent, and will push for ratification early this year. The United States urges every other signatory to do the same, so that the Convention will enter into force for the critical parties at the earliest possible date.

The United States has also been pleased by the progress made by the Preparatory Commission in The Hague on elaborating the complex procedures that will guarantee the Convention's smooth and effective functioning.

The biological and toxin weapons Convention (BWC) has been strengthened since its entry into force by the increased membership and by the confidence-building measures developed by successive review conferences. We believe the world can go further. President Clinton has announced that the United States will promote new measures to increase transparency of activities and facilities that could have biological and toxin weapons applications. The United States also supports the work of the Ad Hoc Group of governmental experts convened to identify and examine potential BWC verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. We support an early conference to consider the report and to discuss the next steps to strengthen the international norm against a scourge that could well become the next weapon of mass destruction of choice.

The Clinton Administration's non-proliferation policy also attempts to find solutions where non-proliferation norms have not taken hold. The United States has taken a strong stand against any North Korean nuclear-weapon ambitions. In coordination with many other countries, we have made it clear to North Korea that, to resolve the nuclear issue, it will have to provide the international community with assurance that it does not possess nuclear weapons and it will not build them in the future. This means that North Korea must remain a full party to the NPT, fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, including accepting regular and special inspections, and fully implementing the denuclearization agreement reached by North and

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South Korea. Our position remains unchanged: North Korea will have to meet these obligations aimed at ensuring a nuclear-weapon-free Korean peninsula and a strong international non-proliferation regime.

Proliferation threats are acute in South Asia and the Middle East. The United States is encouraging India and Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine regional security and arms control issues. We continue to support the activities of the working group on arms control and regional security in the Middle East.

The diffusion of missile technology makes the world a more dangerous place for all of us. The United States wants to strengthen the Missile Technology Control Regime to ensure that it continues to be an effective vehicle to combat missile proliferation.

The Conference on Disarmament is strengthened by its success with the chemical weapons Convention negotiations. It is energized by the prospect of the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is challenged by the demands of enhancing transparency in armaments. It is bolstered by important arms control developments beyond these halls.

Our responsibility now is to make the most of the opportunity before us. The task is immediate; but our results will be long-lasting. The challenges are enormous; but they are matched by the promise of profound results. The path will be difficult; but it will be worth every effort when we arrive at our destination. Let us get down to work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Mr. Holum for his important statement and the wishes he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, allow me first to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference and to thank both you and your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, for the very considerable inter-sessional work you both have done to allow this session of the Conference on Disarmament to enter into the substance of its work as soon as possible. I would also like to join you in welcoming the assumption by Vladimir Petrovsky of the post of Secretary-General of the Conference and in welcoming our new colleagues to the Conference.

The CD once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort; this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and to the non-proliferation architecture. It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the review conference in 1995 for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive

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progress towards a CTBT, or better the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

All the nuclear-weapon States have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the forty-eighth General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon States are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon States continue not to test. If a moratorium were adhered to by all five nuclear-weapon States until we successfully conclude a CTBT, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

I would like to outline the principles which will guide my delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT. First, the Treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time. Second, the Treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all States. Third, the verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, as appropriate. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process. The international seismic monitoring system should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of GSE and GSETT-III will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion. An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyse and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective. It is our view that the United Nations Security Council could determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty. As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador Tanaka which have led to the generally accepted position that we should move quickly to establish two working groups: one on legal and institutional issues and the other on verification.

While the CTBT should remain the focus of our work in this session, as you noted, we also have an opportunity to expand the global non-proliferation effort in yet another fashion and to enhance global security. The United Nations General Assembly also produced a consensus resolution on the "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". That text welcomed the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding the disposition of their fissile material.

The effect of that resolution, however, is to express the wish of the community of nations for a non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Despite having been proposed in

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one form or another for many years, this is a relatively new issue for the CD to consider. A period of consultation and reflection is therefore required to ascertain the best way to move ahead.

Finally, I would like to indicate that Canada will shortly be tabling a compendium of CD documentation on the nuclear-test-ban issue as well as a separate volume compiling treaty and draft treaty texts relating to nuclear test bans. Many of you will be familiar with similar compendia we produced for the chemical weapons negotiations and on which I have received many favourable comments. It is our hope that this compendium will prove a useful reference tool for delegations in the coming months as we turn our attention to the negotiation of a CTBT.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, it is with great pleasure that I congratulate you on assuming the presidency of the Conference. You do so at an important time in the life of this body. This is particularly fitting given your delegation's unfailing support for the Conference. You will have the full cooperation of the United Kingdom in your efforts. I also congratulate your predecessor on his unusually long and successful stint as our President and I join you in welcoming the new Secretary-General of the Conference, the new Deputy Secretary-General, our new colleagues in the Conference and, last but not least, the new Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to whose maiden speech in this forum we have all just listened with great interest.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban-treaty is an objective long aspired to in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Turning that aspiration into reality has been a long process. It has, along the way, produced the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. But until recently the security environment in which this goal has been pursued has militated against its rapid achievement. That environment has now changed. The United Kingdom Government continues to attach importance to the role of nuclear weapons for the preservation of our security now and in the foreseeable future. But we recognize also that the need to ensure effective measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has increased. We were therefore happy to join consensus in August last year on the decision to give the Conference's nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee a mandate to negotiate a CTBT. In the light of this consensus, and in the new security environment, the prospect for achieving the aspiration of a comprehensive test-ban treaty must now be very good indeed. The United Kingdom welcomes that prospect, and is committed to working hard for a successful outcome to these negotiations.

For us, a successful outcome will mean the conclusion of a treaty which makes a real contribution to non-proliferation by interposing a substantial obstacle in the process of developing nuclear weapons. I doubt that any among

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us have illusions that a ban on nuclear testing will in itself prevent the manufacture of a rudimentary nuclear weapon. But in limiting the scope of nuclear-weapons development, it will, we believe, play a valuable complementary role in reinforcing the non-proliferation regime.

The crucial instrument of that regime remains the non-proliferation Treaty itself. We continue to believe that there is an overwhelming case for the Treaty's indefinite extension irrespective of what progress we are able to make on a CTBT. If the prospect of a CTBT being in place to complement the NPT's effectiveness serves to increase the confidence some parties have in the ability of the non-proliferation Treaty to stop proliferation - and if this prospect serves to encourage those parties to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT through indefinite extension, we should welcome that. But an opposite relationship is also valid: that the prospect of indefinite extension of the NPT will be an important factor in convincing us that we can confidently move towards the conclusion of a CTBT.

The United Kingdom Government believes there are two elements essential to enable a CTBT to play an effective role in non-proliferation. First, the treaty should have as large a number of parties as possible. The ultimate aim should be universal adherence. Second, it must have an effective credible and efficient verification regime.

How do we set about ensuring that the treaty we conclude provides for these essential elements? On the question of adherence, we must obviously look to the mechanisms we agree for entry into force. One option might be to follow the model of the chemical weapons Convention, with entry into force conditional on ratification by a fixed number of States. But adopting this formula would provide no guarantee of adherence by all - or indeed any - of the countries whose commitment to the treaty we would regard as necessary if it is to play the non-proliferation role we want from it. We would suggest therefore that, at a minimum, all members of the CD should ratify the treaty before it enters into force. Given that we proceed in this forum by consensus, it is surely not unreasonable to expect that a treaty whose terms we have all been prepared to agree should be ratified by all without undue delay. In this regard, in particular, we look forward to the earliest possible progress on enlarging the CD.

For a CTBT genuinely to help our efforts to counter the threat of nuclear proliferation, the United Kingdom believes that an effective verification regime is essential. Such a regime should be able to detect, and therefore deter, at reasonable cost, attempts to evade the provisions of the treaty. We should aim to avoid constructing an excessively costly and over-elaborate verification system, but at the same time we should ensure that the system is sufficiently sensitive and capable to inspire confidence among the parties that there is a strong likelihood that attempts to evade the treaty's provisions can be detected and identified.

The ultimate goal of universal adherence would not be served if would-be parties were not convinced of the verification regime's ability to detect violations of the treaty even where these were of low nuclear yield and when

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attempts had been made to conceal them. But let us remember also that this goal may not be served if potential parties think the cost of the regime unjustifiably high.

It will be an important task of these negotiations to reach a more precise estimate of the likely costs of a verification regime, and to decide how these costs should be apportioned. But I should at this stage like to place on record our belief that all parties should bear some share of the cost of verifying the treaty. We are, after all, agreed that the aim of the treaty should be to provide for the security of all parties.

We believe that the two main elements of a verification regime would be a monitoring system and provision for intrusive on-site inspection. The principal objective of on-site inspection should be to clarify the nature of any suspect event which might be detected - but not necessarily clearly identified - by the monitoring system. The verification regime will require a global network of seismic stations, but seismic monitoring will of course not be the only means of monitoring. The regime should also provide for other methods of detection - bearing in mind that an effective seismic regime could encourage a country determined to evade the treaty's terms to test in environments other than underground. We will, in addition, support the proposition that a greater degree of detective capability may be required in some regions of the world than in others.

Naturally we hope the verification regime will be sufficiently effective to deter violations of the treaty. But where it fails to do so, it will be necessary to ensure that there is provision within the treaty for action to be taken. We believe it will be necessary to include in the treaty an article on measures that could be taken in case of any such violation. We believe that the chemical weapons Convention provides a good starting-point for determining what sanctions should be provided for by the CTBT.

An important question for us to consider will be how to describe in the treaty what it is we shall aim to ban. We believe that a broad formula such as "any nuclear-weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" should be the one we adopt in our treaty. This formula is familiar to all of us as the one used in the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty. It has been well understood throughout that Treaty's life, and as such offers us a ready-made definition which could serve our treaty equally well. It would, in addition, parallel the language of the non-proliferation treaty, article 1 of which refers to "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

On the question of the duration of a CTBT, we believe that the assumption which guides our negotiating practice should be that we are aiming for a comprehensive test-ban treaty of indefinite duration. This need not mean, however, that we rule out any provision for a review of the treaty after a certain period. Such a review would be able to assess whether the treaty and its verification regime were operating effectively. It would enable us, should it be necessary, to make amendments to that operation. Furthermore,

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the prospect for an indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty will be an important factor conditioning and sustaining our assumption that we are aiming for an indefinite comprehensive test-ban Treaty.

My purpose in this statement has been to look ahead to what we expect to be some of the main issues which will confront us in our work, and to suggest how the United Kingdom intends to approach them. If I have omitted some issues, I have done so for the sake of brevity, and not because I consider them unimportant. But I make no apologies for setting out what to some may seem a demanding set of requisites for our treaty. I have done so because we believe our objective in these negotiations must go well beyond the achievement of a merely symbolic gesture. Our aim is to help produce a credible and effective contribution to non-proliferation, and my delegation is ready to work with energy towards this end.

I should like to make it quite clear that the United Kingdom would regard the rapid conclusion of an effective treaty as an entirely satisfactory outcome to these negotiations. But the rapid conclusion of an ineffective and inadequate treaty would emphatically not be a satisfactory outcome. It is for this reason that we continue to doubt the wisdom of imposing upon ourselves a deadline for the completion of these negotiations.

The United Kingdom has no interest in prolonging negotiations unnecessarily. We must, however, ensure that we do not sacrifice the objective of achieving an effective treaty to that of achieving a quick one. That said, let us work with urgency and vigour towards the conclusion of a credible and effective treaty. For our part, we stand ready to start today.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement and his kind words addressed to my delegation. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Tanaka, who will introduce his report on the consultations he held during the inter-sessional period concerning the mandate and organization of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Mr. TANAKA (Japan): Mr. President, let me, at the outset, congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference at the beginning of the 1994 session. I understand that your work is most challenging, but at the same time full of opportunities. My delegation assures you of our full cooperation on your endeavour to discharge your important duties. I would also like to wholeheartedly welcome to the Conference Mr. Petrovsky as the new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and congratulate Mr. Bensmail on his assumption of the office of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference at this important juncture. I welcome our new colleagues who joined us in our endeavours to promote disarmament and international security.

As you know, the Conference on Disarmament, in the decision contained in document CD/1212 of 10 August 1993, requested the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to conduct consultations during the period between 3 September 1993 and 17 January 1994 on the specific mandate for, and

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the organization of, the negotiation. Accordingly, I held six informal open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee, one drafting session, and innumerable bilateral discussions during this period.

I would characterize the consultations regarding the mandate as successful, because the Ad Hoc Committee agreed in its informal consultations on a draft mandate on 13 December 1993. This draft mandate has been distributed to all delegations, as CD/WP.449. In it the Conference directs the Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security. It also provides for the establishment of at least two working groups, one on verification and one on legal and institutional issues, which should be established in the initial stage of the negotiation. I should like to recommend that the Conference on Disarmament adopt this draft mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban.

I would like to express my appreciation again to all delegates for their time and efforts as well as their spirit of compromise in the informal open-ended consultations, as I think that it was an important achievement to agree on a mandate, and I am pleased that it stipulates the establishment of two working groups.

Another significant accomplishment during the inter-sessional period was the adoption by consensus in the General Assembly of the resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which was sponsored by 157 countries. In this resolution the General Assembly, inter alia, fully endorses the decision of 10 August of the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Also during the inter-sessional consultations I should like to note that a number of documents were introduced which should stimulate discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee. Sweden introduced a revised draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1232); Mexico introduced a working paper on behalf of the Group of 21 entitled "Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty" (CD/1231); and Australia introduced a draft structural outline for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CD/1235).

Regarding the organizational aspects of the negotiations, my informal paper of 30 November 1993 included five parts, from the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee to the formulation of a rolling text of a CTBT. Different views were expressed on various parts of this paper, especially regarding how and when the working groups should start their work. There was no agreement either on how or when a rolling text should be formulated.

Previously, before the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, I also held consultations on various organizational issues surrounding the negotiation and on the questionnaire, which I prepared at the request of the

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Group of 21 and distributed on 1 September. I reported on the results of my consultations and replies by delegations to the questionnaire on 11 October, at the informal consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee. I also distributed this report as an informal paper of the Chairman at those consultations. It included proposals on the organization of the negotiations regarding frequency of meetings, structure of the Committee, programme of work, participation of experts, the role of the Group of Scientific Experts, the treaty text, as well as a draft mandate for the Committee.

At that stage it was already widely recognized that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban should meet as frequently as necessary, including during the inter-sessional periods. Accordingly, in the resolution of the General Assembly on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, delegations requested the Secretary-General to provide the CD with additional administrative, substantive and conference support services for these negotiations.

Regarding the participation of experts, it was recognized that, while special-purpose expert meetings which address specific issues might contribute to the negotiating process, generally speaking, experts should form part of their delegations. As for the role of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, it is my considered opinion that it is important for them to make every effort towards the early and successful achievement of their Third Technical Test (GSETT-3).

Turning to the question of the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1994, based on my early discussions with delegations, I considered it necessary to reach consensus as soon as possible on the next Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. However, despite all the efforts I have devoted to this issue during the inter-sessional period, I have not been able to secure agreement. On the other hand, I understand that this question is being seriously addressed by you, Mr. President, in coordination with the efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, as part of your consultations on how to start the work of the Conference this year. I sincerely hope that we will soon be able to hear a satisfactory outcome of your consultations.

Finally, I conclude my report by expressing my sincere wish that the new Ad Hoc Committee will soon solve the problems which we have been unable to resolve during the inter-sessional period and conduct the important negotiations successfully.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Tanaka. I am sure that I speak on behalf of all the members of the Conference in offering him our wholehearted thanks for having conducted the consultations entrusted to him which, you will remember, dealt with the question of the mandate and the organization of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. I also thank him for his kind words addressed to me. We have come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? If not, I will now give the floor to the Secretary-General of

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the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Mr. Petrovsky will be making a statement about the services allocated to the Conference.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The secretariat is mandated by the General Assembly to report to the Conference on the services to be assigned to it during the 1994 session. As in previous sessions, the Conference will be allocated 10 meetings per week with full servicing, and 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Seismic Group. In other words, we should be able to hold two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1994 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

As the work of the Conference intensifies, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice has in the past prevented the waste of allocated resources in the event of early adjournment of meetings. In this respect, punctuality in starting meetings of the Conference is also important. It is also understood that meetings with full services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

I also wish to recall that measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning savings in documentation continue to be valid. In order to implement these decisions, all documents need to be presented well in advance and duplication of documentation should be avoided. Moreover, I wish to recollect the statement by the Secretary-General to the Fifth Committee on 26 August 1993, of which you are all aware. In this statement the Secretary-General stressed that in view of the financial situation of the United Nations no efforts are to be spared in exercising restraint on meetings and documentation.

I would also like to remind delegations to submit as soon as possible their letters of accreditation so that we may issue passes granting access to the Conference's rooms. As a result of other high-level meetings taking place in the Palais des Nations, security measures have been strengthened and members will be requested by security personnel to identify themselves. May I suggest that members carry with them either their CD passes or at least the identification provided by the United Nations Office at Geneva?

As regards conference room facilities available for the CD, they will be - in addition to the Council Chamber - room I, the conference room on the sixth floor in the area of the disarmament secretariat, room C-108 and room III on an ad hoc basis, depending on the overall requirements facing the Conference Services Division of the United Nations Office at Geneva. When delegations need such facilities for their consultations, I wish to suggest that they kindly address a request to the Conference Officer, Ms. Pasqualin, who is responsible for assigning such services, in order to avoid any overlapping.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for his statement. Does any other member States wish to take the floor? The representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch, has the floor.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In relation to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, a subject referred to by virtually all the speakers who have taken the floor this morning, I would like to make a proposal for a decision that might be the subject of informal consultations over the next few days:

(continued English):

> "The Conference on Disarmament decides to adopt the report (CD/1214) of the Special Coordinator for membership, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, presented at the 660th plenary meeting of the Conference on 12 August 1993, and the recommended composition of the Conference on Disarmament attached to it; the report includes as an integral part the statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993 at the 663rd plenary meeting."
>
> New members will assume their membership of the Conference at a date to be decided by the Conference. The President of the Conference will continue consultations, taking into account the urgency attached to the membership question, and report to the Conference before 31 March 1994."

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Marín Bosch for his statement. We have all taken note of his proposal. With your permission I intend to take up this matter during the informal session after this plenary. I now intend to suspend the plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting, as announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.20 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The 666th plenary meeting is resumed.

I should like first of all to deal with consideration of the draft mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. This draft mandate appears in document CD/WP.449. May I take it that the Conference decides to adopt this mandate?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now move on to consideration of the draft Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of the 1994 session of the Conference. You are all familiar with this draft, which has been the focus of intensive consultations in the weeks leading up to the opening of the session, and which we have just examined in an informal

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meeting. Since there were no objections during the informal meeting of the Conference on the content of this paper, I will now read it to you.

"1. There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1994 session, the Conference decides, pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of this agenda and without prejudice to their outcome, to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1993 session:

"1. Nuclear test ban.

"2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

"3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

"4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

"5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons.

"6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

"7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

"8. Transparency in armaments.

"9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"2. The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: 'Nuclear test ban', 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space', 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' and 'Transparency in armaments'. For this purpose, the Conference establishes ad hoc committees on these items with the following mandates:

"- Nuclear test ban (document CD/1238);

"- Prevention of an arms race in outer space (document CD/1125);

"- Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (document CD/1121);

"- Transparency in armaments (document CD/1150).

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"3. The Conference also decides, in the framework of agenda item 2, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', to appoint, as a first step, a Special Coordinator to seek the views of its members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It further requests the Special Coordinator to report on the progress of his consultations before the end of the first part of the session.

"4. The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two Special Coordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda respectively."

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the delegations for the spirit of compromise they have demonstrated, which has enabled us to move forward in our work.

Lastly, I would like to move on to consideration of requests made by States which are not members of the Conference to participate in the work of this session. These requests are contained in document CD/WP.450, which was distributed today, and come from the following States: Austria, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe. May I take it that the Conference decides to invite these States to participate in our work?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Does anyone wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Weston.

Sir Michael WESTON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, my delegation was happy to go along with the statement which you have must made on the agenda and organization of work for the 1994 session on the understanding that our acceptance of the appointment of a Special Coordinator to seek the views of members of the Conference on Disarmament on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was without prejudice to a later decision on the forum in which the convention would eventually be negotiated. On the same basis, we were ready to agree that the Special Coordinator should be requested to report on the progress of his consultations before the end of the first part of the session.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Weston for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand for a short statement.

Mr. BISLEY (New Zealand): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the Chair and offering you the full cooperation of my delegation? I also welcome the special representative of the Secretary-General on his appointment as Secretary-General of this Conference and congratulate Mr. Bensmail for his promotion to the rank of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

I would like to state the following on behalf of Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, Iraq, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

We regret that the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to achieve consensus on the expansion of its membership. We urge the Conference to continue its efforts to come to a solution. As a way forward, we would support an approach whereby the Conference decides now on the recommended composition, but leaves open for the Conference's further decision the date when the new members will assume their membership of the Conference. I wish to stress that, for our part, such an approach is not the solution we would prefer, but rather is an interim measure.

I wish to express the hope that the members of the Conference consider this approach, and try to come to agreement, preferably in the next plenary meeting of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Since we have reached the end of the agenda, I will now adjourn the meeting. I would like to remind you on this occasion that tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 I will be holding the traditional consultations with the group coordinators and China in the sixth floor conference room in the secretariat in order to examine pending organizational questions.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 27 January 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.667
27 January 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 January 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

GE.94-60167 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 667th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I intend to begin, if you will allow me, by calling on the speakers on the list for this meeting, and then to consider the new requests from non-member States wishing to participate in our work for this session.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of the Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, Egypt, Senegal and Argentina. Consequently, I give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) (translated from French): It is a great honour, Sir, to address the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of its work for this year under the guidance and inspiration of your presidency. You are a son of France, a great nation, a State with which my own enjoys close relations by virtue of so many ties that it would be impossible for me to enumerate them all here this morning. I wish you good luck and Godspeed. My Government and I have every confidence that you will bring your work to the desired conclusion with great skill. I assure you of my fullest support and that of my delegation.

(continued in English)

Allow me also to express my deep appreciation and respect to your predecessor, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, for his leadership during a long and demanding presidency in which he competently and tenaciously carried out his difficult and delicate tasks.

I would like to salute our new Secretary-General, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, concurrently Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. The Netherlands also warmly welcomes Deputy Secretary-General Abdelkader Bensmail. I would like to take this opportunity to say farewell to esteemed colleagues who have recently taken up other duties. Ambassador Arteaga of Venezuela and Ambassador Semichi of Algeria. I wish them every success in their new activities. At the same time let me welcome the Ambassadors who have recently joined the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Lampreia of Brazil, Ambassador Ibrahim Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Vattani of Italy. It is heartening to note that our colleague El Ghali Benhima of Morocco has rejoined the ranks of the CD.

At the outset of my statement today, I would like to recall briefly the evolving international framework for our present-day priorities. I will then address issues concerning the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, notably chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and the role of the CD with a view to achieving a nuclear test ban and a prohibition of the production of fissile materials. The third part of my statement concerns another priority matter, the transparency process and conventional

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arms transfers. Also, I will touch on some organizational aspects of our work, notably those concerning negative security assurances. Finally some words on the important membership issue.

It was General de Gaulle who said in his book Le Fil de l'Epée that "international laws have no value without troops. Whatever direction the world takes, it will not manage without arms". This is only too true.

The Conference on Disarmament is starting its 1994 session in a climate where in some parts of the world prospects for progress and reconciliation have emerged. At the same time international uncertainty and instability continue in other parts. Freedom and stability are prerequisites for durable and comprehensive development, but, sadly, they are still lacking in too many parts of the world. In his intervention before this forum on 3 June last year, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs stated some basic premises of the Netherlands Government's approach to international security.

> "In the view of the Netherlands, freedom and stability go hand in hand. Long-term stability is only conceivable in an environment defined by democratic political systems, free-market economies, social justice, respect for human rights, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Dealing with regional conflicts is next to impossible if one does not tackle head-on the underlying causes of conflict. In the long run, no State can afford to isolate itself completely from events taking place in other parts in the world. Brutal aggression, repression, 'ethnic cleansing', whether they occur in Cambodia, the Middle East, Europe, Africa or anywhere else, inevitably affect us all, if only because they undermine stability. Stability is essential to security. And without security, there will be no rule of law and no sustained economic development."

Since my Minister addressed the Conference, this pattern of concomitant hope and distress has continued worldwide. I refrain from enumerating once again all examples of distress, whether in the form of brutal aggression, repression or "ethnic cleansing". Rather, I would draw on more positive developments.

There is clear evidence that the international community is coming to grips with long-outstanding problems in certain parts of the world. The United Nations operations in Cambodia are proving to be a success. There are prospects for reconciliation and peace in the Middle East after the milestone agreement between Israel and the PLO in Washington in September last year. The Geneva meeting between Presidents Clinton and Assad seems to have further broken old stalemates. In Europe we witness historic transformations. The shape of a new security architecture is clearly developing, based on principles of freedom and stability. A new climate of long-term cooperation has emerged, a Partnership for Peace, the invitation to which was issued recently by the heads of State and government participating in the NATO summit meeting. Such a partnership is essential if durable stability is to be secured and prospects for a sustained transition to modern economic and social systems are to be fulfilled.

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In relation to disarmament and international security, last year's General Assembly certainly produced many tangible results, with consensus resolutions on a number of nuclear items and on the work of the First Committee itself, an overdue but very welcome appreciation of changing circumstances.

It is against the backdrop of this evolving international framework that the priorities of the arms control and disarmament agenda for the 1990s have to be determined.

A major result in completing that agenda for the 1990s was the recent signing of the chemical weapons Convention in Paris. The process of ratification of the Convention is proceeding smoothly in several States. Meanwhile, the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is doing its utmost to ensure that the mechanisms for compliance with the Convention will be ready on time. During last year's General Assembly it was therefore disheartening to see that certain States, and amongst them even members of this Conference, were displaying a less than responsible attitude towards the chemical weapons Convention. If we agree, as we surely all do, that the promise of the Convention cannot be delivered unless all its signatories respect the integrity of its provisions, then there should be no repetition of the unfortunate debates which marred the draft resolution on the chemical weapons Convention during this General Assembly.

While I do not wish to dwell too much on the unfortunate developments of last autumn, it is nevertheless to be recalled that the importance of economic and technological development and international cooperation in the field of peaceful chemical activities is a well-established principle in the Convention. Subjective interpretations of that principle can only become a source of recurrent disputes, especially at a time when we should heed the legitimate concerns of the international community as a whole about the ongoing proliferation of chemical and, for that matter, biological weapons in certain parts of the world. A State that does abide by its international non-proliferation commitments should have no reason to worry about export control regimes. It is self-evident that global norms pertaining to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation on the one hand, and export control regimes on the other, are complementary: one deals with the demand side of proliferation, the other with the supply side. Global normative instruments and export control regimes thus form interlocking parts of the same security policy.

On biological weapons, my Government will actively contribute to forthcoming consultations concerning the strengthening of the biological weapons Convention. The Netherlands looks forward to the early convening of a special conference of States parties to the biological weapons Convention, which should result in a clear mandate to negotiate a verification protocol to the Convention. That protocol should be negotiated in a proper international forum, preferably the Conference on Disarmament. My Government urges States that have not yet done so to request the depositaries of the Convention formally to convene a special conference.

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Despite major international agreements, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has not stopped. The non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains one of the most important tasks the international community has set itself. The non-proliferation Treaty, which is to be reviewed and, hopefully, extended indefinitely and unconditionally next year, therefore remains a cornerstone of the security policy of the Netherlands Government. Preparations for this crucial conference are well under way, as could be witnessed during the second PrepCom in New York last week.

My Government is grateful that a number of States have recently decided to, or actually have, become party to the non-proliferation Treaty, thus bringing closer the moment that this Treaty will truly have universal application. The global nature of the Treaty stems also from the nature of nuclear weapons. In this context my Government strongly welcomes the recent trilateral agreement between the United States, Russia and Ukraine which, inter alia, provides for the elimination of all nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. The Ukrainian experience should inspire others. Some States believe that considerations of regional security are not compatible with their adherence to the universal norm of the NPT. However, as examples in Latin America and southern Africa have also shown, tensions which are the root cause of proliferation at the regional level can be dispelled through confidence-building measures. My Government therefore calls on States concerned to pursue vigorously such regional confidence-building measures, with a view to removing incentives to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The Netherlands attaches priority interest to the negotiation in this year's CD session of a universal and effectively verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would be of great benefit to our non-proliferation efforts and also to the strengthening of the non-proliferation Treaty. The Netherlands delegation therefore warmly welcomes the establishment, in the opening plenary on 25 January last, of an Ad Hoc Committee mandated to negotiate a nuclear test ban. This smooth start augurs well. I express the hope, Mr. President, that under your inspired leadership the CD will also agree without delay on the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. This is a proper moment to express gratitude to Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka of Japan for his commendable performance as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, during both the regular session of the Ad Hoc Committee and the inter-sessional meetings. Thanks to his efforts, we are now in a position to start negotiations as such.

My delegation looks forward to a fruitful general debate on a nuclear test ban, with contributions from all members of the Conference on Disarmament, especially from those delegations that have urged that such a debate take place. A more academic debate on a test ban has gone on in this forum for years. Consequently it will be possible to identify without too much difficulty the basic parameters of a treaty which will command wide adherence and which will provide for an efficient verification regime. I would like to offer a few parameters for such a treaty. First, a test ban must be a comprehensive one: tests of peaceful nuclear explosions should be included in the ban. This should be spelled our unequivocally. A common

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understanding on the scope of the ban is essential if fruitful negotiations are to begin soon. Mere references to certain treaties are not sufficient in the light of the obvious possibility of differences of interpretation of existing treaty texts. Second, precisely because of the obvious non-proliferation aspects, the negotiations should proceed in a climate free of further nuclear testing. As matters stand now the argument that further technical benefits are required before halting all tests is not completely convincing. The present level of technical expertise should be deemed sufficient. Adequate alternatives to testing can be developed further through simulation techniques. Thirdly, the debate must at an early stage focus on the required verification techniques to be negotiated. The ban does not necessarily have to dispose of the whole plethora of such techniques. The ensuing verification measures between them must not be too complex. The CD should make a judicious choice with a view to ensuring that the NTB verification regime becomes effective and manageable from both a technical and a financial point of view. Fourthly, attention will have to be devoted to issues like the proper duration of the future treaty and a sanctions regime to obviate treaty violations. In short, I look forward to a debate which should swiftly determine the prohibition we want to negotiate and the means to effectively verify that ban.

Last year the General Assembly adopted for the first time by consensus a resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a ban can certainly be seen in the light of the success of ongoing non-proliferation efforts. An additional reason for establishing such a ban stems from existing concerns about the release of highly enriched uranium and plutonium as a consequence of nuclear disarmament taking effect. The international community should respond to those concerns. There is a worldwide glut of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Consequently, there is no further need for their production.

In this regard I have three general observations. First, the non-discriminatory character of a future ban on the production of fissile material should not lead to de facto discrimination between those who have produced in the past and those who have produced only very little or not at all. If there is to be different treatment in view of the past, such treatment should be clear and acceptable to all in the light of existing different international treaty rights and obligations. Second, a "cut-off" treaty should not lead to legitimizing a situation whereby existing stocks can be kept, without such stocks being subject to some form of international control. In other words: threshold States should neither be legitimized nor encouraged to acquire weapons-grade material shortly before a "cut-off" treaty comes into force. This is a delicate aspect which must be looked at very carefully. My Government wishes to encourage discussions and other efforts aimed at establishing reliable and transparent mechanisms to manage the globally existing stocks of plutonium. Efforts to that effect both in Vienna and in Geneva should go hand in hand. Thirdly, to be effective, verification will have to be focused on those facilities which give real cause for concern. For the negotiation of the verification regime of a future "cut-off", a high level of technical knowledge and experience will be needed. It is clear that one should make the best possible use of existing resources to elaborate

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proper and effective verification provisions. To that end, again, the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna should be sought as and when required.

As for the handling of this subject, the Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Whereas it has not been possible to have an Ad Hoc Committee established for the negotiation of a "cut-off" treaty right away, my delegation notes the intention of our President to appoint a special coordinator for this issue. Hopefully, that approach will prove to be helpful.

Let me now turn to what in the view of the Netherlands delegation is the most important area of conventional disarmament the Conference has to deal with in 1994: transparency in armaments. The history of transparency in armaments, and notably the establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, is by now well known. With the establishment of the Register, the General Assembly requested the CD to address a number of aspects of openness and transparency in armaments. In order to deal with these requests the Conference at the beginning of its 1993 session established the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. Under the able leadership of Ambassador Mounir Zahran, who in 1992 had served as a special coordinator for transparency in armaments, the Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 held 15 meetings in the course of which a great amount of new ground was covered and many views were expressed on the General Assembly's requests.

From its report, we learn that the Ad Hoc Committee conducted a substantive exchange of views on a number of complex issues surrounding the subject of transparency in armaments. Also, a number of interesting thoughts and proposals were expressed on the present and future functioning of the Register, for instance that States should start exchanging information on military holdings and procurement through national production and the proposal that States could make an annual declaration to the United Nations on the size and organization of their forces. However, no consensus recommendations could be reached as to any of these proposals. The fact that an Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments has been re-established holds out promising prospects for sustaining and expanding the progress made in Geneva last year. The CD should apply some urgency here, since, outside Geneva, the work of the CD will have to be taken into account by the 1994 Group of Governmental Experts on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

The fact that the Register is widely supported was reflected in the adoption by an overwhelming majority of resolution 46/36 L, which established the Register, and the consensus by which resolutions on transparency in armaments and the Register were adopted in the subsequent years. The broad support for the Register was further evidenced by the satisfying level of participation by United Nations Member States over the first operational year of the Register, 1992. During the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, a report of the Secretary-General was published (A/48/344) which lists 80 national returns. More returns have come in since.

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The Netherlands considers this to be a good and promising start. The public data now available through the Register create transparency in conventional arms transfers and thus effectively contribute to building confidence among the community of States. Here, I would say we are faced with a critical innovation, if not a quantum leap to greater trust. The data, being government-supplied, obtain official status. Not only is existing knowledge on arms transfers confirmed and supplemented, but the returns to the Register also qualify henceforth as objects for official government-to-government communications.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has bestowed the honour upon the Netherlands to chair the New York Group of Governmental Experts to which I just referred. It will meet three times between February and August 1994, and has the important task to assist the Secretary-General in preparing a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. In doing so the Group of Experts will have to take into account, inter alia, the work of our Conference on the issue. However, the Group derives its mandate from resolution 46/36 L and consequently remains directly responsible to the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The report of the Group of Governmental Experts will be submitted to the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly. It goes without saying that the Netherlands is fully prepared to continue its contribution to the efforts the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament undertake to enhance the transparency drive. Greater transparency contributes to building confidence and trust among States and increases stability in all regions of the world. It also holds out the prospect of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments. Transparency thereby enables nations to make more adequate use of scarce socio-economic resources in a more secure world. It is in a secure environment that investment flourishes.

In the opening plenary on 25 January last, the Conference on Disarmament decided on the re-establishment of its ad hoc committees. I congratulate you, Mr. President, on this resolute start.

None the less, a note of caution seems warranted. My delegation has always been reluctant to establish ad hoc committees which subsequently prove to be less than productive. I believe that delegations should seriously look at ways by which for example the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances could conduct its work in a more meaningful manner. It was for years the only Ad Hoc Committee that, besides the Ad Hoc Committee for chemical weapons, had a clear negotiating mandate. The international situation has however substantially changed. The security assurances recently extended to Ukraine are a case in point. The conditions for having a fresh look at possible converging elements in the various assurances have never been better.

As for substance, it is my Government's position that on the one hand there should be a willingness to go beyond national interests and look at ways and means of aligning the various negative security assurances in a realistic way. On the other hand, such assurances have to be seen in the light of ongoing non-proliferation efforts. The alignment of negative security

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

assurances could eventually take shape either through an agreement or through a mandatory Security Council resolution. To each of the present negative security assurances pertains an element of conditionality. It is not realistic to expect that any of them will ever be unconditional. Indeed, negative security assurances could only become unconditional at the risk of diminishing security rather than enhancing it. One cannot expect a negative security assurance to be valid against a State which flouts its non-proliferation commitment, that is to say engages in activities which could transform it into a potential nuclear-weapon State. None of the present assurances is valid in a conflict under such circumstances anyhow.

Last but not least, I would like to say a few words on the subject of the expansion of membership of our Conference. Presently, it is difficult to imagine a compromise solution acceptable to all. The efforts of your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, and those of the Special Coordinator, Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan, testify to the intricacy of the issue. The Ambassador of Mexico submitted an intriguing new proposal on 25 January last. It is the conviction of my delegation that the CD will have to adapt and to expand if it wants to shed its old remnants of bipolarity and become a truly multilateral and representative negotiating body, fit to help complete the arms control and disarmament agenda of the 1990s. I submit that an enlarged CD membership obtains critical relevance in negotiating a nuclear test ban and in ensuring widespread commitment to the eventual treaty.

The Netherlands indicated last year its agreement with - and preferences for - a range of solutions. I will not repeat them now. I emphasize, however, that the membership issue is one of high priority. The nomination of a new special coordinator, as is the intention of our President, is a bare necessity. The overall importance of this question, however, warrants the continued attention of the CD presidency. The membership issue must and can be solved quickly. I urge expediency and flexibility.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement. I am grateful to him for his cordial remarks addressed to me, by which I was particularly touched. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, first of all I should like to congratulate you most sincerely upon your assumption of the responsible task of being this year's first President, a task you discharge so competently. We are all aware that the first President of any CD session carries a special responsibility for bringing the Conference to substantive work. We have full confidence in you; we are sure that the CD will overcome its procedural phase very soon. In this regard and in all other regards, you may rest assured of the full cooperation of the German delegation. Mr. President, let me also echo the welcome extended by the previous speaker to new colleagues on all sides of the Council chamber.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral body to negotiate universally applicable arms control and disarmament treaties. If it wants to meet its universal role more effectively, the Conference on Disarmament should

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

extend its membership as soon as possible. In principle all States wishing to participate in the CD should have a right to do so. Unfortunately, the efforts made to extend membership have not yet been successful. From the German point of view, the proposed O'Sullivan extension package is still a sound and useful formula. However, we are flexible and would welcome any other initiative which has the potential to establish consensus within the CD at an early date.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will be the core issue of this year's deliberations of the CD. I wish to congratulate Ambassador Tanaka on his untiring efforts as the Chairman of last year's nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee to provide the CD with a mandate and the organizational outline to negotiate such a treaty. My Government, as outlined in Foreign Minister Kinkel's 10-point initiative on non-proliferation, has long advocated a comprehensive, verifiable nuclear test ban. We believe that such a treaty is important in terms of both nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy. An advanced negotiating process on a comprehensive test ban would also have a positive influence on the climate for an indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. We should do our best to achieve negotiating results by 1995. Today I will not deal at length with the structure and contents of the envisaged treaty. I will content myself with a few remarks. In our understanding, with a view to strengthening and developing the international non-proliferation regime, the scope of a nuclear test ban should not only comprise the nuclear explosion as such. Rather, it should also include preparatory or assisting activities directly preceding nuclear explosions. We advocate an effective international and universal verification regime, which should be able to respond to this scope of a nuclear test ban. A verification regime based merely on seismological data could only cover a nuclear explosion after it has taken place. This will not be sufficient. We should invest some more efforts in finding out which verification technologies for which environment are most appropriate for that purpose. Any verification regime we develop should meet the requirements of universal acceptability, feasibility and affordability. We will also have to deal with possible non-compliance with the treaty and, to this end, on-site inspections will be of paramount interest.

A convention banning manufacture of fissionable material for weapon purposes, the so-called cut-off convention, will be of particular importance in the context of non-proliferation. We welcomed the American proposals made in this regard. In our view, the Conference on Disarmament would - due to its universal representation and vast negotiating experience - be the appropriate forum for the negotiation of such a convention. Despite the full programme of work which lies before us, we should make sufficient time available to start negotiation of such a treaty before the end of this year. At the same time, maximum use should be made of the expertise of other organizations, such as IAEA.

Apart from the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee, which for obvious reasons will be the most important committee this year, we welcome the speedy re-establishment of all other ad hoc committees.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

My Government holds the view that effective international arrangements to secure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are by themselves a justified request. The outcome of our deliberations on this subject could have considerable influence on the forthcoming NPT extension conference in 1995. In accordance with the corresponding resolution adopted with only three abstentions by last year's United Nations General Assembly in New York, we should make every effort to find a consensus-reaching formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.

As to transparency in armaments, last year's Ad Hoc Committee conducted a substantive exchange of views on how to respond to the request of the United Nations General Assembly in 1992 that openness and transparency in this field be further increased. A number of proposals were presented. We expect that constructive efforts be undertaken to continue this important task in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee. Furthermore, we are looking forward to the activities of the group of governmental experts in New York, under the able guidance of Ambassador Wagenmakers, which aim to assess the operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and put forward proposals for its further development.

I take the view that, as mentioned in the German 10-point initiative on non-proliferation, transparency in armaments should not be limited to conventional arms. There should be considerations for enhancing transparency in the field of nuclear weapons as well. The idea of a nuclear-weapon register or a register on nuclear disarmament aims towards strengthening international confidence in nuclear disarmament. Such a register may be a possible complement to the confidence-building policy we helped to implement when establishing the Register of conventional weapons at the United Nations. I look forward to the continuation of this debate in this year's Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments.

Finally, in the field of prevention of an arms race in outer space, we have to remind ourselves that the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space still lacks a negotiating mandate. I take the position that this year's Ad Hoc Committee could explore in a step-by-step approach possible avenues for the negotiation of an agreement on confidence-building measures and that it should make every effort to start discussing a negotiating mandate soon.

A huge amount of work lies before us, but we have the chance to lay the foundations for a whole set of treaties that have a bearing on nuclear non-proliferation. It will depend on us whether the Conference on Disarmament plays the prominent role it should have in this context.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French). I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ukraine, Ambassador Slipchenko.

Mr. SLIPCHENKO (Ukraine): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to congratulate you on the assumption of these extremely important functions. I would also like to extend my greetings to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky in his new capacity as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, as well as to his newly appointed deputy, Mr. Bensmail.

The Conference on Disarmament has commenced its 1994 session being faced with a set of challenges it has to meet in order to prove its ability to provide adequate responses to the most acute questions in the field of disarmament and international security. While concentrating the efforts of the participating States on the areas where real progress can be made and tangible results can be obtained relatively soon, the Conference must not, however, lose track of its ultimate purpose and ensure continuity of the disarmament process. By the same token, acknowledging the significance of a CTBT as a priority item on the agenda of the 1994 session of the CD and its direct link to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, we regard non-proliferation as a part of this process rather than a means of the mere securing of the status quo.

In their recent joint declaration President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of the Republic of Kazakhstan stressed that "Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which have voluntarily chosen the path of getting rid of nuclear arms, the most lethal weapon in human history, cannot but feel deep concern over their security, which they do not imagine out of the universal international security context. It is against this background that the tripartite statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States of America and Russia signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994 bears special significance. The tripartite summit reaffirmed once again the usefulness and desirability of compromise, as well as testifying to the futility and counter-productivity of confrontation. It consummated a long period of sometimes arduous preparatory political and diplomatic work, including intensive debate to the Ukrainian Parliament.

The content of the tripartite statement has de facto proved the validity of Ukrainian concerns related to the process of its relinquishing the nuclear arsenal inherited from the former USSR and deployed on its territory. In the course of negotiations the parties involved managed to work out a common approach which makes it possible to take fuller account of the national interests of Ukraine. This embraces national security guarantees, and we note with satisfaction the readiness of the Government of the United Kingdom to offer Ukraine the same security guarantees as the United States of America and Russia, fair compensation for fissionable materials contained in the nuclear warheads, and economic, financial and technical aid to Ukraine to cope with the formidable job of eliminating nuclear weaponry. In this connection we share the opinion expressed by Mr. J. Holum, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at the opening plenary meeting of the CD that while opening up the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons, the tripartite statement should help establish a pattern of stable political relationships.

(Mr. Slipchenko, Ukraine)

In the same spirit President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine stressed, after the signing of the statement, that "Ukraine de-blocked the process of nuclear disarmament. Ukraine has proved that it was not following some special paths, but it has embarked upon the road of civilization and the interest of humankind. This is most important for the European and international communities."

My country, which was the first to put forward a productive idea of tripartite negotiations, has consistently demonstrated political will to look for juridical formulas and technical arrangements acceptable to all parties involved, and to establish a reliable international mechanism for addressing the practical problems of nuclear disarmament.

Ukraine was guided by these very considerations when presenting the idea of the establishment of an international fund for promoting nuclear disarmament in Ukraine, which has already been voiced in different international forums, including the CD and the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. A draft agreement on the creation of the fund elaborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine provides for its conclusion on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The fund is designed as a primarily intergovernmental organization, which would use its financial resources for the purpose of the destruction of nuclear weapons, including ensuring the ecological safety of this process, and providing employment for the professionals working in corresponding industries, thus precluding their outflow to other countries. The draft agreement envisages broad privileges and immunities for the participants in the fund and its foreign employees, openness of the activities of the fund, and scope for the donor countries to exercise control over the use of their financial contributions.

The active role played by the Ukrainian leadership in bringing about the tripartite statement is evident proof of my country's determination to honour its commitments and to make a constructive contribution to the international efforts aimed at making this world a safer place to live. This definitely applies as well to its participation in the work of the multilateral negotiating bodies of which the Conference on Disarmament is considered by us as one of the most authoritative and important. Hence it is our desire - together with other countries - to become a full member of the Conference. We also hope that the painful experience which is being accumulated by our State in the process of its denuclearization can be helpful in working out solutions and recommendations on the matters being currently treated within the framework of the CD. In this connection we would pay special attention to the agenda item on effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The inability of the Conference to find a positive solution to the membership expansion problem - notwithstanding resolution 48/77B of the forty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly - not only blocks full-scale participation of the countries which wish to be and can be its active members. It also puts certain limits on the activities of the Conference itself, especially now when the Conference is about to start

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negotiating a CTBT designed as a document of truly universal character. The very process of work on the CTBT calls for the involvement of all States in possession of the "threshold" level of nuclear technologies in particular the USSR successor States which have nuclear weapons deployed on their territory. It should also be taken into account that consensus on resolution 48/77B in its part concerning allocation of additional resources for the work of the CD was reached only on the presumption that the expansion will take place at an early stage. It is with this understanding that we support the proposal tabled by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico at the first plenary meeting of the 1994 session, regarding the date of 31 March 1994 mentioned in this draft decision as one by which the positive resolution of the problem of the CD membership expansion should be achieved.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Ukraine for his statement and his kind remarks addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Zahran, who will present his report on the consultations carried out during the inter-sessional period, followed by a statement on behalf of his country.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Sir, to express to you my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this crucial phase at the beginning of the Conference's session, this difficult phase of preparing for its activities in 1994. With your talent and your energy, I am sure that you will be able to steer the work of the Conference effectively.

(continued in English)

I wish also to take this opportunity of extending a warm welcome to the new Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, whose personal knowledge of disarmament matters and vast experience in multilateral diplomacy will certainly be an asset to our Conference. In addition, I have pleasure in extending my congratulations to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail on his promotion to the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference and Chief of the Geneva branch of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. Mr. Bensmail is known to all of us and I am sure we will all benefit from his long and valuable experience in the Conference. I should like also to join others in welcoming our colleagues who have just joined us, namely Ambassador Yousuf Omar of Ethiopia, Ambassador Hocine Meghlaoui of Algeria, Ambassador Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Ambassador Alfredo Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Ambassador Alessandro Vattani of Italy, and assure them of the cooperation of my delegation in their new responsibilities.

I am taking the floor today in order to inform the Conference on Disarmament on the activities and consultations I have undertaken on its behalf since the plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament 3 September 1993. Following the decision of our previous Secretary-General, Ambassador Berasategui, to resign from his post, I was requested by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to consult the members of the

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Conference on the appointment of a new Secretary-General as well as of a Deputy Secretary-General. As a result of these consultations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations decided to appoint Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and Personal Representative, on an interim basis, in addition to his current functions and responsibilities as Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail as Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition, I had the honour to introduce, on your behalf, the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the 1993 session to the First Committee of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly. I highlighted then the significance of the decision taken by the Conference on 10 August 1993 giving its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I also had the privilege of conducting intensive consultations on the elaboration of the draft resolution in the First Committee on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. It is a source of satisfaction that this resolution, which, inter alia, welcomes the determination of the Conference to fulfil its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community in the light of the evolving international situation with a view to making early substantive progress on priority items on its agenda, was adopted by consensus.

Moreover, in conformity with the decision contained in paragraph 15 of the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly (CD/1222), I have conducted consultations with the aim of reaching consensus on the expansion of membership of the Conference. In this regard, I have led several rounds of consultations with the groups and individual members of the Conference in order to bring about a solution acceptable to all. During these consultations, I presented a number of formulas, inter alia the proposal put forward by Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia (CD/1214) and a proposal to accept all those non-member States which had applied for membership up to 3 September 1993, as well as different variants thereof. However, I regret that, despite all these efforts and continuous consultations in the inter-sessional period here in Geneva and in New York, it has not proven possible to achieve consensus on this important issue and, therefore, further efforts will be required by the Conference, which may consider appointing a new special coordinator to conduct further consultations with the members of the Conference to achieve that objective.

While in New York I also met, on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament, with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Mr. Marrack Goulding, and with the Disarmament Centre, with whom I discussed the need to provide additional human and financial resources to the disarmament secretariat which would, in turn, impact positively on the work of the Conference on Disarmament as a whole specially in light of the current crucial phase and responsibilities of the Conference. The reaction which I received was positive.

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Furthermore, in preparation for the 1994 session of the Conference, in close cooperation and consultation with you, Mr. President, and with the assistance of the secretariat, I conducted several rounds of consultations with group coordinators and the delegation of China, in order to ensure a smooth transition and preparation of the work of the new session of the Conference on Disarmament. Various issues of importance to the work of the Conference were addressed during these consultations. These include, inter alia, the agenda and organization of work for this year; the establishment of ad hoc committees on items on the agenda; their mandates and chairmanships; as well as the most appropriate organizational arrangements to deal with various other issues before the Conference. I am happy to say that these consultations, in which all groups displayed a remarkable spirit of compromise and mutual cooperation, have resulted in a state of affairs which I am sure will be conducive to a very early start to the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament.

I would now like to make a brief statement on behalf of Egypt on some of the issues of importance to my country on disarmament matters at the global as well as the regional level.

For several decades now, Egypt has been a staunch supporter of the cause of nuclear disarmament. Egypt is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is at the origin of numerous initiatives in this field. Emanating from this position, Egypt learned with satisfaction that during 1993 several nuclear-weapons States declared moratoria on nuclear testing. It is our hope that the near future will see a definitive end to all nuclear text explosions. It is therefore with great expectation that we look forward to participating actively in the negotiations in the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee, which we believe must be given primary priority so that it may move promptly in 1994 towards concluding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

While we attribute priority to the nuclear test ban we must not, however, neglect other issues of high importance such as NSA. It is our view that existing positive security assurances are insufficient and that they must be developed into comprehensive positive as well as negative security assurances through a legally binding instrument.

The issue of cut-offs in the production of fissionable materials is also one which we consider can greatly contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and one which must be pursued seriously and vigorously. The CD is the appropriate negotiating forum to deal with this issue. However, positive as it is, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 1993 forty-eighth session on this issue stops short of dealing with existing stocks.

With the rapidly approaching 1995 NPT review and extension conference it is important for us to stress again the positive influence that a concluded CTBT and comprehensive NSAs would have on the successful outcome of this

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conference. Bearing this in mind we cannot but stress the dire need to conclude a CTBT in 1994 and to achieve significant progress in the field of NSAs.

Since 1974 Egypt has been one of the original sponsors of the annual resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East. In 1990 President Mubarak of Egypt launched another initiative for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Given this commitment to nuclear disarmament, Egypt is indeed satisfied by the significant and rapid progress being made on the drafting of a treaty or convention on the long-overdue denuclearization of Africa.

It was as far back as 1964, when the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity was meeting in Cairo, that the Cairo Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa was adopted. For more than 30 years now a series of resolutions have been regularly adopted both by the General Assembly of the United Nations and by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity calling upon States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and calling for the implementation of OAU's Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. This issue will also be one of the items on the provisional agenda of the upcoming meeting of the Council of Ministers of OAU, which will start in Addis Ababa on 31 January 1994.

In its most recent resolutions, the General Assembly has indeed called upon the Secretary-General, in consultation with OAU, "to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with OAU to meet". Three such meetings have indeed taken place, most recently from 5 to 8 April 1993 in Harare. During this meeting significant drafting work was undertaken and two upcoming expert meetings during 1994 will undoubtedly bring the text closer to its final conclusion.

It is Egypt's hope that all African States and all extra-African States which will necessarily have to be involved in this endeavour will fully cooperate to facilitate the conclusion of the treaty and will fully accept its provisions as well as those of its protocols.

As a further expression of Egypt's firm commitment to the early conclusion of a treaty on the establishment in Africa of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it gives me pleasure to announce today that the Government of Egypt offers to host the signing ceremony of the said treaty.

Finally, I must say in ending Egypt's long presidency of the Conference on Disarmament that I wish to place on record my deep appreciation to all delegations for the support they have extended to me during the past months. I also wish you, Mr. President and friend, Ambassador Errera, the very best of luck in your endeavours and wish to assure you once again of my continued cooperation and support in pursuit of our common goal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Zahran. On behalf of all of you I would like to convey to him once again our warmest thanks for the tireless efforts he made during his term of office. I also thank him for the kind words he addressed to me and his wishes to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Senegal, Ambassador Ka.

Mr. KA (Senegal) (translated from French): As I am addressing the Conference on Disarmament for the first time as Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Senegal, allow me at the outset to assure this august forum of the wholehearted concern and readiness of my delegation to cooperate in the interests of the realization of the noble objectives that this Conference has set itself. Mr. President, I would like to tell you how agreeable it is for me to take the floor today under your presidency. You represent a State, France, with which my country, Senegal, has always maintained firm relations of cooperation which have been mutually beneficial in every respect. I am sure that under your guidance the Conference will obtain tangible results thanks to your human qualities, your wisdom and your skill as a distinguished diplomat. Allow me also to take this opportunity to thank my brother and friend, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, for the skill and leadership with which he presided over the Conference on Disarmament during his term of office. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the outstanding qualities of the new Secretary-General of the Conference, to our brother, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, the Deputy Secretary-General, and through them to the United Nations Secretary-General for the excellent report submitted to the Conference.

I thought I was going to be able to address my colleagues here as representative of a State that was a full member of this Conference. But I feel great regret and also disappointment at seeing that, despite United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/77B requesting the Conference to reach a consensus on the expansion of its membership before the 1994 session, no satisfactory solution has yet been found to this question. My country, Senegal, which submitted its request for admission in 1982 and has always participated in the work of the Conference as an observer, has never ceased to emphasize that the question of the expansion of the Conference urgently demands a decision.

Senegal has always thought that the Conference on Disarmament should be open to all States that wish to be part of it and have specifically expressed their interest, conviction and commitment with regard to disarmament. The conclusive results of the work carried out by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, special coordinator on this question at the time, had raised hopes that unfortunately were quickly dashed. This situation is all the more regrettable since at the end of the twentieth century the world has experienced such upheavals that it has become even more necessary to adjust our views, approaches and methods of work ir a field that is so crucial as that of collective security. First of all, the tensions of the cold war have disappeared. Current threats are more due to regional instability, the spillovers from ethnic and religious struggles and the upsurge of nationalist sentiment. The threats to international peace and security stemming from

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non-military sources of instability were clearly recognized by the Security Council in the declaration issued at the end of the summit meeting of 31 January 1992.

The present international climate, dominated on the one hand by positive signs that point to great possibilities and great hopes for general and complete disarmament and on the other hand by challenges and serious threats to international peace and security, impels us to unite our efforts with a view to completely putting an end to nuclear testing, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the use or threat of use of these weapons of mass destruction. If profound changes have now markedly altered relations between States and have led to opportunities for building peace and security on cooperation and détente in several regions of the world, nevertheless real threats have re-emerged and have become a source of increasing concern to the international community.

The objective that we are all striving towards in the long term is to reduce levels of armament and to establish confidence by means of legal instruments of disarmament that would be binding both at the world level and at the regional level. Because the achievement of this noble objective demands the efforts and the political will of all actors in the international system, Senegal would like to be able to participate fully in this exciting undertaking. For this reason, we view the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament as necessary especially at a time when the question of the expansion of other very important bodies in the United Nations system is being studied elsewhere with a view to revitalizing them and ensuring that they reflect the changes that have occurred in the geopolitical scene. My country, for its part, in agreement with the 22 other States that were recommended in the report of the Conference on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly (CD/1222) for full membership of the Conference, will spare no effort to attain this objective and help the Conference respond to present and future challenges. We hope that the proposal made here on 25 January by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico concerning this question of expansion will receive the support of all the members of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT, (translated from French): I thank the representative of Senegal for his statement. I also thank him for the warm words that he addressed to my country and to me, which I appreciate greatly. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Sánchez Arnau.

Mr. SANCHEZ ARNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me at the outset to express my genuine satisfaction at the opportunity to address this plenary of the Conference for the first time and to express my gratitude for the kind words of welcome I have received. It is for us an honour to do so under the presidency of the French Republic. Your presidency, Ambassador Errera, is a guarantee of efficiency and impartiality and we commit ourselves to cooperate loyally with you in your efforts to make progress in the work of the Conference. At the same time, I would like to extend a welcome on behalf of my Government to Ambassador Vladimir Petrovsky, as Secretary-General of the Conference. His experience in negotiations on

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disarmament and arms control will constitute an important contribution to the work of the Conference at a very special juncture in its history. We are also convinced that in Abdelkader Bensmail he will have a colleague whose abilities are commensurate with the tasks ahead of us.

One year after giving the community of nations such a crucial instrument for international security as the chemical weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament is now preparing to tackle a new challenge in the shape of the negotiation of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Argentina is ready to participate intensively in these negotiations, with the objective of concluding in the shortest possible time an instrument capable of generating the necessary confidence in the effective enforcement of the definitive prohibition of nuclear test explosions. This attitude taken by my country is related to two important developments in Argentina's foreign policy, which have a direct bearing on the work of our Conference. The first of these is very recent. On the occasion of the eighth special session of the General Conference of OPANAL, held in Mexico City on 18 January 1994, the Argentine Republic deposited with the Mexican Government the instruments of ratification of and the waivers to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco), as amended in 1990, 1991 and 1992. This marks the culmination of a process initiated just over two years ago when the Government of Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem took the decision to bring our security and non-proliferation policy into line with a world that had undergone profound changes. This decision by the Argentine executive branch was endorsed by the National Congress, which in less than a year adopted a favourable view and approved the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the amendments to it. As a result the Treaty of Tlatelolco is now fully in force for the Argentine Republic. We hope that in a very short time enough countries will accede to the Treaty so that the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean becomes a reality.

Secondly, my Government has announced its intention to begin taking the necessary steps towards accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the course of 1994. For us this decision is the logical corollary of a series of initiatives we have been taking consistently in recent years, among them the joint efforts we have made, and are continuing to make, with the Republic of Brazil in the nuclear field, as well as with Chile and other Latin American countries in this and other facets of the security of our region.

As we have seen, the responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament, far from decreasing, are acquiring more importance and substance in these times. This requires from all of us a very special effort and the need to tackle the substantive work with no further delays. Hence we express the hope that we will be able very soon to complete the procedural aspects related to the establishment of the ad hoc committees so as to get down to the work which the international community has entrusted to us.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and I also thank him for the very kind remarks he addressed to me. We have now come to the end of the list of speakers for today. Would any other representative like to take the floor at this stage?

As I announced, I would now like to invite the Conference to consider the new requests for participation in our work from the following non-member States: Bangladesh, Colombia, Denmark, Jordan, Kuwait, Slovenia, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates. The secretariat has distributed today, with the symbol CD/WP.451, a note from the Chair containing these requests. During the consultations I have been holding, there has been no objection to these requests. In the circumstances, I propose that we adopt the recommendation contained in document CD/WP.451 directly in plenary, it being understood that this will not constitute a precedent for future occasions where an informal meeting might be necessary. May I take it that the Conference takes a decision to this effect?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before adjourning this plenary meeting, I would like to inform the Conference that the consultations with a view to completing the consideration of matters relating to the organization of our session, in particular those concerning the chairmen of the committees and the appointment of special coordinators, are continuing in an intensive manner. I hope that with cooperation from all sides we will arrive at an agreement on these issues very shortly.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 1 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.668
1 February 1994

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 1 February 1994, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Gérard Errera (France)

GE.94-60203 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I declare open the 668th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, I would like to welcome the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, Mr. Jaakko Blomberg, who will be addressing the Conference. Mr. Blomberg visited us on two occasions last year and his presence here again today attests to the sustained interest of his Government in the work of our Conference.

It is my intention first to give the floor to the speakers on the list for this meeting, and after that to take up the pending issues, namely, the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Algeria, the Russian Federation, Belgium and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I now give the floor to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland, His Excellency Jaakko Blomberg.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): First, Ambassador Errera, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference, and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I am convinced that under your leadership this year's session will get off to a smooth and efficient beginning. I would also like to use this occasion to welcome Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky as the new Secretary-General of the Conference, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail as the new Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

The international community has now embarked on the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such a treaty will be a true step towards a more secure world. Finland will contribute to these negotiations. We support a rapid process that will lead into a worldwide treaty which will put an end to all nuclear testing, thereby strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With intensive effort the bulk of the work could be done by the end of this year.

In this context, I wish to outline briefly our views on some key points in the coming negotiations. First, we support the scope of the treaty as proposed by Sweden in the revised draft which was presented in December last year. The Swedish text could serve as a basis for the negotiations. Second, a workable treaty requires effective verification. In this respect, the chemical weapons Convention established a modern standard. Seismic monitoring is the primary technical means for the verification system. The right to conduct challenge inspections is essential to determine that parties are not engaged in prohibited activities. It also serves as a deterrent to potential violators. Third, proper verification of the test ban requires proper organization. For reasons of technical competence and cost-effectiveness Finland believes that this task of the future treaty could best be handled within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It is important that the test ban be negotiated in a multilateral setting. The

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

credibility of the treaty requires it. We hope that the Conference on Disarmament is able to move rapidly into practical negotiations in the working groups.

There is a wide range of activities involving the legacy of the cold war. In a short time, arms control has progressed remarkably. We welcome the most recent development, the trilateral agreement between the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United States. When implemented, this agreement will lead to the removal of all the nuclear weapons that are presently in Ukraine. This agreement deserves the strong support of the world community. Finland supports the ongoing disarmament process within the territory of the former Soviet Union. In cooperation with IAEA, Finland has initiated a safeguards support programme in Ukraine. We have also applied for membership of the Moscow International Science and Technology Centre, and have allocated significant resources for our future participation.

Finland will work with many other States in all parts of the world to secure the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1995. The NPT is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It serves our common security as no other international instrument can. It is imperative that the NPT continue to do so in the future. The vital role of the NPT is being recognized ever more widely. We welcome the accessions of Armenia, Belarus, Guyana and Mauritania to the NPT, as well as the decision of Kazakhstan to ratify it. These represent five important steps towards universality. We have also noted with satisfaction the announced intention of Algeria and Argentina to join the Treaty before the 1995 conference.

The recently concluded second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT conference took a number of important decisions. Finland was particularly happy to join in the endorsement of Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka as President of the 1995 conference. We will continue our active participation in the preparatory process.

Intensive efforts are called for in the prohibition of production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The CD already has a role to play on this issue. We hope that the consultations of the Special Coordinator will lead to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. In this area the CD should work in close cooperation with IAEA.

The strengthening of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT or other legally binding multilateral instruments within the non-proliferation regime is an issue of growing importance. We believe that it is time to step up this work within the CD.

Questions related to conventional weapons and forces require growing attention. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms provides a worldwide effort in promoting stability and security through increased openness and transparency. The number of returns for the first data collection last year was promising. In further efforts, increasing the number of countries providing requested information for the Register is an important

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

goal. The Group of Governmental Experts that will meet during this year in New York will address further possibilities to develop the Register. The experience gained in the European context proves that there is a wide range of possibilities to increase openness and transparency. The CD, for its part, is expected to contribute in the area of transparency in armaments.

We regret that the expansion of the membership of the Conference is still pending. The solution to the question is important also with a view to truly multilateral participation in the negotiations on the test-ban treaty. The CD has a collective responsibility to make progress in this question. Since the expansion is a matter of great interest for us as a candidate, we would like this process to be carried forward in a transparent manner. We support the proposal presented by Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico in the plenary meeting on 25 January. This proposal is not the optimal solution. We would rather join immediately. But we do see this as a way to move forward in the expansion. My hope, Mr. President, is that you could bring this proposal rapidly forward for the consideration of the plenary meeting. A positive outcome on this would facilitate the work of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs of Finland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Meghlaoui.

Mr. MEGHLAOUI (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, on behalf of the Algerian delegation, I would first of all like to join with those who have congratulated you on the occasion of your taking up the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Your experience and your competence, which have been emphasized by mary colleagues, augur well for the success of our activities. The efficiency with which you are conducting our deliberations is beginning to bear fruit, because we have already reached an understanding on the programme of our work for 1994. We hope that we will be able to establish the main subsidiary bodies of the Conference without wasting time. This would be a good signal for the session now beginning. In that regard, the news we have learned this morning seems satisfactory. I wish you good luck, Sir, and assure you of the full cooperation of my delegation. I also wish to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Zahran, for the invaluable efforts he made over a long and demanding period, and for the remarkable results he achieved.

We learnt with satisfaction that His Excellency, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, has been appointed to follow the activities of our body as Secretary-General. We welcome him. Mr. Petrovsky will be assisted by an official whose competence and qualities are well known, Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail. We congratulate him on a promotion which is considered by all to be well deserved. We are convinced that our new Secretary-General, his deputy and their team will continue to make a discreet but always efficient contribution to the work of the Conference. I would not wish to fail to thank very sincerely all those who welcomed me, and you were the first to do so, Sir.

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

For a number of years Algeria has been engaged in a process of accession to multilateral disarmament instruments. This process is part of a global approach. It is encouraged by the progress that has already been made in the spheres of disarmament. Thus, in January 1993 we were among the first to sign the Convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The ratification procedure is under way. We will be very pleased when the total elimination of this category of weapons becomes a reality. On the occasion of the inauguration of the nuclear reactor in Birine on 21 December last, our Minister for Foreign Affairs formally announced Algeria's intention to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. In fact, the Algerian nuclear programme has never been at odds with the provisions of this Treaty. Our cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency has always been marked by total transparency, and we have concluded voluntary safeguards agreements with the Agency that cover the two nuclear facilities in the country.

Algeria has always devoted particular attention to the issues of non-proliferation and disarmament. Hence our great relief following the understanding that was reached during the inter-sessional period on the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with negotiating a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We hope that this mandate will be implemented with the same spirit of cooperation, understanding and speed as that which presided over the discussions held under the effective guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. We also hope that the interest shown in the conclusion of a test-ban treaty will not be temporary. As we have already had occasion to say in the Ad Hoc Committee during the inter-sessional period, resolution 48/70, which describes the negotiation of such a treaty as a "priority task", was co-sponsored by almost 160 States Members of the United Nations and adopted by consensus. The Conference on Disarmament must therefore respond to this veritable appeal from the international community. In this regard, by submitting to a moratorium on nuclear testing throughout the period of the negotiations, the nuclear Powers would greatly contribute to the success of our work.

The prohibition of nuclear weapons, however, is not an end in itself. It is a step towards the advent of a denuclearized world. Other measures must be taken. The Conference on Disarmament is preparing to examine for the first time, in the context of item 2 on its agenda, questions dealing with the production of fissile material. We welcome this positive development, which originates in a move made by a nuclear Power. We too hope for the conclusion of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes. We encourage the special rapporteur to hold intensive consultations on this point and to work towards its consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in an Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate. The expertise of IAEA might be required to establish verification machinery.

If optimism is beginning to be justified, there is still no lack of grounds for disquiet. We will mention two. The first concerns what are commonly called negative security assurances. In the last statement which he made to the Conference on Disarmament, my predecessor, Ambassador Sémichi, expressed the concern of the Algerian Government at the lack of progress in

(Mr. Meghlaoui, Algeria)

the work of the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with this important issue. It is to say the least frustrating that 14 years after its establishment this Committee, which - need I recall? - has a negotiating mandate, continues at the end of each session to record the refusal of certain nuclear Powers to take into consideration the legitimate right of States that have voluntarily denied themselves the nuclear option not to be the subject of threats. Today, now that the international context has changed, the recognition, in a clear, multilateral and unequivocal treaty context, of the right to such guarantees is within our grasp. Let us not forget that this has a considerable influence on the future of the entire system of nuclear non-proliferation. Equally, let us not forget that the legitimate security needs of each State cannot be suppressed.

The second reason for disquiet that we shall mention - and it is not the last of them - concerns the prevention of an arms race in space. The Ad Hoc Committee is going to continue its work for the tenth consecutive year, and the discussions that take place there have not so far led to any result. The international situation has improved greatly and we think that it is high time to give this Committee a true negotiating mandate. We might consider, for instance, separating the efforts to develop means of reaching an understanding on confidence-building measures from the question which lies at the very origin of the establishment of the Committee, namely the drafting of a multilateral treaty to prevent the militarization of space. These would not be competing or exclusive approaches but could be complementary. We think that they could be considered in separate working groups, provided that consensus could be reached that would not give one an advantage over the other.

My delegation deeply regrets that the Conference on Disarmament was not able to overcome the obstacle that prevented its expansion last year. The delegations that had expressed their wish to become full members of the Conference found in Ambassador O'Sullivan the faithful spokesman of their concerns and the conclusions that he arrived at still enjoy our full support. We fear that the introduction of elements that are alien to the concerns of our Conference in the handling of the expansion issue might block this process indefinitely and cause the Conference to lose some of its credibility. The delegations of the 23 selected States have submitted a compromise proposal. This does them credit. It shows yet again the determination of these States to contribute to the work of the Conference. We are fully aware of this and we continue to hope that a solution may be found in the coming weeks.

Sir, in your introductory statement, you stated how much the recent evolution of international relations has created an oppressive dichotomy. We share your views to a great extent. At the same time as international disarmament agreements are being signed or tensions are diminishing, new conflicts are arising or reappearing after periods of latency. This contrast reflects the mass of problems facing the international community. In terms of the Conference on Disarmament and the task that has been assigned to it, it means that cooperation and understanding between the delegations present here will be vital in order to make an effective and consistent contribution to the efforts which will expedite disarmament and strengthen peace.

(M[illegible]eghlaoui, Algeria)

Before concluding I would like to reaffirm the attac[illegible] of Algeria to the efforts being undertaken in the fields of non-proli[illegible]ion and disarmament. However, this is the place to restate our c[illegible]ion that all States are entitled to access to science and technology for the purpose of development. We are aware of the complexity of this issue. But we think that this is a legitimate right. There is no development without peace; conversely, peace without development is an illusion. I would like to assure you, Sir, that my delegation will do its best to contribute to the success of the mission facing all of us and will lend you its full and undivided assistance.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and the kinds words addressed to the Chair, which I particularly appreciated. I now give the floor to the representative of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Berdennikov.

Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, first allow me to greet you as the representative of the friendly country of France and congratulate you on taking up the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament. You are taking the Chair at a highly crucial time when the essence of the question of the future role of the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in modern global politics is being resolved, when the Conference is being assigned new and complex tasks, first and foremost that of drawing up an international treaty relating to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. We are convinced that you will be able to resolve successfully the procedural issues pertaining to the beginning of the session of the Conference. In this we are counting on your diplomatic skills, your many times proven capacity to find solutions to the most intricate problems. In carrying out the duties of President you can of course count on the cooperation and support of the delegation of the Russian Federation.

I would also like to thank your predecessor as President of the Conference, the Ambassador of Egypt, Mounir Zahran, for the work that has been done. We highly appreciate the efforts made by Ambassador Zahran during the final phase of the work of the Conference in 1993 and during the inter-sessional period, including the period during the session of the United Nations General Assembly. It is with pleasure that I welcome my compatriot, Ambassador Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky, to the post of Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. I am convinced that the immense experience and well-deserved prestige of such a remarkable diplomat and scholar as Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky, with whom I have had the pleasure of working for many years, will help the Conference on Disarmament to take its proper place within the system of international relations in the new post-confrontation period. I cannot fail to congratulate my old friend Abdelkader Bensmail on his long-deserved appointment to the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference. We value highly Mr. Bensmail's professionalism, profound knowledge and impartiality, which perfectly correspond to this new responsible post. I welcome the new representatives of Algeria, Venezuela, Italy and Ethiopia who have joined us recently and wish them every success.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

It is now important to get the CD session off to a good and dynamic start in this new year of 1994. In this regard the message that United Nations Secretary-General B. Boutros-Ghali addressed to the Conference was very timely, in particular his accurate comment that the end of bipolarity has not diminished but has rather increased the need for disarmament. We endorse this important conclusion. The fact that this is indeed so is borne out by the emphasis placed on military and political issues during the recent Russian-American summit in Moscow. The Moscow Declaration, the joint statement by the Presidents of Russia and the United States on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery, the joint statement on issues of export control and policy in the area of transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies, as well as a number of other documents adopted during that summit, give a practical dimension to the partnership between the two Powers. During the January meeting Russia and the United States embarked in earnest on the elaboration of measures intended to ensure the irreversible character of current and envisaged deep reductions in nuclear arsenals and to reinforce confidence in the nuclear field. In particular, agreement was reached that the Presidents of the two countries would order the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under the command of either side so that by no later than 30 May 1994 those missiles are not targeted. The joint Russian-American documents expressed satisfaction at the elimination of the vestiges of the "cold war", in particular the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM), which is due to be abolished no later than 31 March 1994. Russia and the United States declared their readiness to cooperate in the establishment of a new multilateral export control regime which would not be directed against any State or group of States and which should control transfers of dangerous technologies and items in order to prevent their use for purposes that are incompatible with regional stability and non-proliferation regimes.

Among the important achievements of the Moscow summit were the trilateral arrangements between Russia, Ukraine and the United States recording Ukraine's commitment to transfer to Russia all nuclear munitions located on its territory for subsequent dismantling in the shortest possible time. Arrangements were made for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to be compensated in a fair and timely manner for the value of the highly enriched uranium in nuclear warheads located on their territory as they are transferred to Russia. An important aspect of the trilateral statement is the confirmation of the readiness of the depositaries of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to offer Ukraine security assurances once the START-1 Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT. We hope that this will happen in the very near future.

Strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime in every way and making it universal are priority aspects of Russian foreign policy. In this connection we welcome the intention of Argentina and Algeria to joint the NPT. Russia firmly favours the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the 1995 conference. We are convinced that this Treaty is an effective instrument for the maintenance of international security and stability and corresponds to the interests of

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

the entire international community. We view positively the results of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 conference which was recently held in New York. The decisions adopted, notably those related to the election of the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador J. Dhanapala, to the post of President of the Conference, the documentation that will have to be prepared for the 1995 conference and participation in the work of the Preparatory Committee and the Conference itself by States that have not yet joined the NPT and non-governmental organizations, are necessary steps in the preparations for this forum. As we see it, the main goal of the 1995 conference is to adopt a decision concerning the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. This is a self-contained task, and it should not be linked to any other. From our point of view the indefinite extension of the NPT is of such importance for maintaining international peace and security that it would be wholly justified if a decision on this matter were adopted by the Conference with the participation of high-ranking representatives of States, for example Foreign Ministers. After adopting a decision on this matter the Conference could turn to other problems, including the issue of how different articles of the Treaty are being implemented.

As you know, during the Moscow meeting the Presidents of Russia and the United States of America expressed support for the speedy completion of negotiations on a CTB and declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process. The Presidents appealed to other States to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held. In this connection I would like to place special stress on Russia's readiness in principle to accept as of now a verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Our approach to the negotiations will be designed to ensure that they are largely completed if possible by spring 1995. These negotiations will undoubtedly be a priority activity of the Conference on Disarmament in 1994. They must receive the most favourable treatment in terms of organization at this Conference. We express our gratitude to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB at the last session of the Conference, Ambassador Yoshitomo Tanaka, under whose leadership not only important preliminary work for the negotiations was done, inter alia regarding the verification of the future treaty, but also a negotiating mandate was agreed for the Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like to share some of the views of the Russian delegation concerning the main provisions of the future CTB treaty. In our view the issue of the scope of the treaty should be resolved on the basis of existing international arrangements, primarily the 1963 Moscow partial test-ban Treaty, with the addition of course of a ban on underground tests. We believe it inadvisable to include in the scope of the treaty the issue of so-called preparatory activities for nuclear tests. Our studies of this issue demonstrate that, firstly, it is extremely difficult to identify preparatory activities for nuclear tests which are not dual-purpose in nature, and, secondly, a ban on preparatory activities would make the verification mechanism of the future treaty significantly more complicated and more expensive.

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

The CTB treaty should be of a non-discriminatory nature. By this we understand equal rights and obligations set forth in the treaty for all parties to it without any exclusions. Of course, the non-discrimination principle should also apply to the verification machinery that will be provided for in the treaty. The Russian delegation proposes that the treaty should provide for an effective international verification mechanism making maximum use of existing monitoring capabilities. During negotiations on the verification mechanism the Russian delegation will also pay close attention to the financial side of the issue, without detriment, of course, to the effectiveness of verification. The treaty should contain provisions on notifications of large-scale explosions involving chemical explosives and also allow for the possibility of international observation during the preparations for and the conduct of such explosions. In considering the question of the international organization for the implementation of the treaty, our main yardsticks will be competence and an acceptable level of costs associated with its establishment, running expenses and operations. The CTB treaty should be of unlimited duration. In connection with the need for the treaty to be truly effective in the sense of encompassing not only all the nuclear Powers but also States that have the potential to develop nuclear weapons, we are convinced that the treaty should enter into force after a certain number of instruments of ratification have been deposited - 65, for example - provided that they include the instruments of all States that on the date of the treaty's signature possess nuclear power stations and research reactors. The treaty should provide for the most stringent sanctions against a State party violating its main provisions, including the application by decision of the United Nations Security Council of economic or other coercive measures provided for in the United Nations Charter. The Russian delegation believes that the CTB treaty should not be linked with any other issues in the field of arms control or the strengthening of international security, and that no problems in those areas should be linked to a CTB treaty. Experience has demonstrated that, as a rule, linkages of any kind prove counterproductive. At the same time we of course recognize that there is an objective relationship between efforts to conclude the CTB treaty and the strengthening of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime in all its aspects, as is reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB adopted by the Conference.

The Russian delegation also supports the early initiation at our Conference of negotiations on a multilateral agreement on a verifiable ban on the production of fissile weapons materials. This measure is long overdue and would contribute significantly to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would also be a step forward in the process of nuclear disarmament. We believe that not only all the nuclear Powers but also countries that are potentially capable of producing nuclear explosive devices and have the appropriate plants - essentially for uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing - should become parties to such an agreement. The future convention should place a reliable impediment in the way of the further production of highly enriched uranium and the extraction of plutonium for weapons purposes, and should stipulate IAEA controls. It should not apply to materials already stockpiled. At the same time, we believe it appropriate to examine the need to ban transfers to other countries of fissile weapons

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

materials from existing stockpiles. We proceed from the view that the Conference on Disarmament could also make use of the extensive expertise of IAEA in this area. Individual expert meetings in Vienna or Geneva drawing on the Agency's expertise could provide a useful input for the development of a political/legal instrument in the CD. The Russian delegation supports your intention, Mr. President, to appoint a special coordinator on this issue to prepare the ground for negotiations.

I would like to remind you, in this context, that at their January meeting in Moscow the Presidents of Russia and the United States agreed to establish a joint working group which, inter alia, would explore the possibility of placing part of their fissile materials under IAEA safeguards. Special attention in this connection will be devoted to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps aimed at precluding the reuse of those materials for nuclear-weapon purposes. As for Russia, we are also prepared to agree that all the nuclear Powers should place under international control - under IAEA auspices - weapons materials released as a result of the elimination of nuclear weapons subject to reductions. In the interests of transparency we are prepared to consider the issue of exchanges of data on the quantities of such materials and their storage facilities.

As is well known, the Russian delegation has consistently called for the initiation of substantive negotiations aimed at developing a multilateral agreement - perhaps a convention - on effective security guarantees to non-nuclear States. Under such an agreement nuclear and non-nuclear States would make undertakings to one another. In the event, however, that other States are not yet ready for such an option, practical work could be begun with a view to developing a joint formula for "negative" assurances applicable to all five nuclear States. Such a formula could later be placed before the United Nations Security Council in order to give it mandatory status in international law. We propose that in parallel with the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on "negative" assurances, consultations among the five nuclear States should be started as soon as possible, with a view to developing such a joint formula. We are sure that all the conditions exist for the success of this work. In this connection I should like to recall that during the Moscow summit it was agreed that Russia and the United States would jointly consider appropriate ways of strengthening security assurances for States that have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and strictly abide by their obligations in that regard.

The Russian delegation considers that the issue of the admission of new members into the Conference on Disarmament should be settled without further delay. We support the proposal on this issue made by the Special Coordinator, Ambassador O'Sullivan, that an additional 23 States which have made appropriate statements of their wish to become full members of the Conference should be admitted as members of the Conference. One cannot but regret that no general agreement has yet been reached on this matter, and was not reached at the inter-sessional consultations held under the guidance of the President of the Conference. In order to get things moving we would be prepared to support any consensus that may take shape on the proposal made at the meeting of the Conference on 25 January by the representative of Mexico and supported

(Mr. Berdennikov, Russian Federation)

by the representative of New Zealand, speaking on behalf of all 23 countries included in the list prepared by the Special Coordinator. This proposal is of course far from ideal, primarily because it postpones sine die the time when the new members will be able to take their place among us. Nor is it clear what conditions must be met for this to happen. In connection with the new proposal made by the representative of Mexico, it seems we would once again have to return to the question of appointing a new special coordinator on the question of the expansion of membership.

The Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral forum of the international community in the area of disarmament, faces global tasks. The Russian delegation will spare no effort to ensure that the Conference can make its contribution to accomplishing these tasks.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his statement and for his kind words addressed to me, of which I was particularly appreciative. I now give the floor to the representative of Belgium, Ambassador Guillaume.

Baron GUILLAUME (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to join my colleagues in expressing the full confidence of my delegation in you in the important functions you are undertaking to assume. You told us that it was fate that put you in this position at this time; we consider that your fate constitutes our good fortune. I also wish to welcome the new colleagues who have joined us - Mr. Palmeira Lampreia of Brazil, Mr. Sánchez Arnau of Argentina, Mr. Omar of Ethiopia, Mr. Meghlaoui of Algeria, Mr. Tarre Murzi of Venezuela and Mr. Vattani of Italy. As of now I can assure them of the full cooperation of my delegation. But I would also like to join my colleagues in welcoming the presence among us of our new Secretary-General, Mr. Petrovsky, Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, and the new Deputy Secretary-General, Mr. Bensmail. We will value their assistance.

The new colleagues whom I have just mentioned join us in this forum at a crucial time for the Conference on Disarmament. Just a year ago the Conference, in drawing up the treaty on chemical weapons, proved that a few countries - if they were motivated by sufficient determination - could devise a system of international commitments that was subsequently endorsed by four fifths of the States on the planet. To what do we owe this success? I think essentially to our methods of work. As they are based on the rule of consensus, we could not build rules to be imposed on a country unless it had previously accepted them. We could persuade, we could not impose. Hence the importance of mutual confidence in all our work. We may have different approaches, often we even have divergent philosophies, but if we have a common aim, if we have the will to reach it, we will succeed if we maintain a climate of total confidence among us. This climate of confidence made possible the drawing up of the treaty on chemical weapons, which remains to date the CD's best claim to fame, but it also presides over the work of the various ad hoc groups of the Conference. We can even see it in the title of some, as in the case of NSAs, but we see it above all in the entire philosophy which determines our work: how can we speak of transparency in armaments, how can

(Baron Guillaume, Belgium)

we accept the principle of participating in arms registers, if there is not at the base this confidence that I am referring to here? In this body we have created a climate of collective confidence; it generated equally collective responsibility. This is the consideration that prevailed yesterday in choosing the CD as a forum for the negotiation of a CTBT; it is the best argument for deciding tomorrow to add to our work the negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for military purposes. The most important task that awaits us this year is the negotiation of a treaty on the halting of nuclear tests. We have to set to work urgently and I would like to take this chance to thank and congratulate Ambassador Tanaka for his excellent work in setting us on the right track as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group until now. We must begin immediately, without more ado, even though we might regret the fact that all the attempts that have been made so far to broaden the membership of the CD have been unsuccessful. In this field, Belgium thinks that we should be able to receive in the Conference any country that shares the same objectives as ours and is ready to seek ways and means of reaching them on the basis of the confidence described above.

There is a saying in English: "Where there's a will there's a way". For this particular issue, we all clearly announced on 10 August last our resolve to reach an agreement on halting nuclear tests: it is for us to seek ways and means of bringing this about. Belgium is a country that has never had the ambition of becoming a nuclear Power, but recognized the positive role that nuclear weapons have played in maintaining peace for almost half a century. Nuclear weapons intimidate, and that is their role in deterrence, but they are also extremely dangerous and that is why we uphold non-proliferation. In order to bring this about, we must first of all give guarantees and reassure those that have none. We will succeed in producing an agreement on the halting of nuclear tests only if it is accompanied by a series of verification measures designed to allay the fears of all concerned. This is the most important point in the entire negotiation and you may be assured that Belgium will do everything within its power to reach the desired result. To that end it is necessary to devise an effective international system that is capable not only of detecting a nuclear test that has occurred but will also sound the alarm if any nuclear tests are imminent. We are not here only to note the violation of international obligations, we are gathered here in the interest of non-proliferation. The verification system we set up must therefore take into account everything that precedes a nuclear test and can give warning of its imminence. In this connection, we note that the negotiations on banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also something we are going to have to confront with the need for the development of a verification system: this could to a substantial extent complement the one we will set up for the CTBT. Let us therefore devise an effective multilateral system that will encompass these aspects, but let us keep it flexible and financially manageable. The experience of IAEA could be very useful to us in this matter. We know the objective, we have the context; on the basis of past experience, we have an exceptional climate of confidence. I have no doubt that under your guidance we will have the drive necessary to ensure a rapid and sound start to our work.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me, which I appreciated. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Han.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, my delegation, at the outset, would like to warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference.

Last year, the President of the Conference appealed to the Conference not to continue the debate on specific issues, namely the Korean peninsula's nuclear problems, out of consideration for the characteristics of the Conference and for the positive progress of its business. It was the same advice given by the secretariat last year and even this year. My delegation fully accepted and respected these opinions and advice. So we did not intend to raise these questions in this forum at the outset of the Conference. On the opening day this issue was raised again by certain delegations - by the United States and France - therefore, my delegation could not but explain our position to the Conference once again.

As is already known, the DPRK and the United States sides published a joint statement after reaching an agreement on the matters of principle for the solution of the nuclear problem and they had talks on this basis. In the joint statement, the two sides confirmed the basic principles of the solution to the nuclear problem: to refrain from nuclear threats; respect each other's sovereignty; ensure a fair obligation of full safeguards; and the United States' support for the peaceful reunification of Korea and it clearly defined the DPRK and the United States as the parties vested with the chief responsibility and authority for the solution of this problem. According to this, we have taken practical measures for the solution of the nuclear problem and acted in good faith in the course of the talks, until today. With the publication of the DPRK/United States joint statement, we unilaterally suspended the effectuation of our declaration on our withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty and resumed negotiations with IAEA and the North-South dialogue. And, under this auspicious situation, we totally froze the movement of nuclear material within the DPRK to fulfil our commitment to provide the transparency of our nuclear activities and allow inspections to ensure the continuity of safeguards in this regard. Particularly, we made a big, bold decision to replace the existing graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors, sacrificing the independence of our nuclear power industry in order to fundamentally dispel the so-called suspicion of nuclear development against the DPRK. All these efforts have, however, failed to call forth a practical response from the other parties and the current situation is developing in the opposite direction. This is attributable to the faithless stance of the United States side, a party to the bilateral negotiations.
I would like to inform the Conference of the main contents of the statement of the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs yesterday, 31 January 1994. The content of the statement is as follows.

"The process of a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula has recently run up against a grave challenge.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"The United States has created a momentous crisis that is likely to develop into a catastrophe, at this crucial juncture when prospects are in sight for saving the DPRK/United States talks from the current deadlock and striking a package solution to the nuclear issue.

"As is already known, toward the end of last year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States agreed on immediate future measures aimed at holding a third round of the talks and reaching a package solution to the nuclear issue, under which the United States will cancel its 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises for 1994 and the DPRK will accept inspection of limited scope on its nuclear facilities required to ensure the continuity of the safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

"Accordingly, it is within the framework of the DPRK/United States agreement and with our extraordinary patience and maximum tolerance that we have so far discussed with the IAEA secretariat the scope of the inspection intended to provide the continuity of the safeguards.

"The IAEA secretariat, however, has deliberately ignored the unique status of the DPRK, which set a moratorium on its declared withdrawal from the NPT and tried to force full-scope inspections equivalent to the DPRK's de facto return to the Treaty, inspections on which the DPRK and the United States could reach an accord at their future talks, instead of the inspection designed for the continuity of the safeguards.

"The demand for full-scope inspection clearly goes against the spirit of the bilateral agreement and it is absolutely beyond discussion at all at this point in time, when the United States nuclear threat remains yet to be removed, the IAEA's partiality and injustice remain yet to be redressed - factors that triggered off the DPRK's withdrawal from the Treaty.

"This notwithstanding, the United States, a party to the bilateral talks, has never tried to help straighten out the IAEA secretariat's misconduct but completely reversed the bilateral agreement on the inspection designed exclusively for the continuity of the safeguards and officially urged the DPRK to accept the demand of the IAEA secretariat for full-scope inspections.

"The United States has gone to the length of imposing a deadline for this and issued an ultimatum that it will not agree to hold a third round of the DPRK/United States talks but seek 'sanctions' unless the DPRK accepts IAEA's demand.

"What should be noted seriously is that the United States has again broached the 'special inspection' of the DPRK's two military sites, which have no relevance at all to its nuclear activities, and taken the lead in the ruckus for international pressure on the DPRK.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"All the facts clearly prove that, so far, the stated United States preference for a negotiated resolution of the issue and its busy come-and-go are, in the final analysis, simply a stratagem aimed at devising a pretence for strangling the DPRK and at stalling for time needed to this end.

"The United States machinations of strangling the DPRK have been proved self-evidently by the new war manoeuvres the United States has been pursuing behind the screen of the DPRK/United States talks.

"In violation of its repeated commitment to the principle of assurances against the threat and use of force, the United States plans to defiantly go ahead with its large-scale nuclear war exercises against my country, including the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises.

"United States officials say that they plan to continue other joint military exercises if they cannot conduct the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises this year, and they even say openly that these exercises should be held in Hawaii, if it is not possible in South Korea.

"When we proposed the United States cancellation of the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises as a major agenda for the talks, our objective was to eliminate the United States nuclear threat against the DPRK once and for all, not just to demand the military exercises.

"The United States posture for 'resolving' the nuclear issue with its nuclear war exercises going on against the other party to the dialogue is a mockery against the DPRK and negation of the dialogue itself.

"What we cannot overlook is the fact that the United States hardline and conservative forces are pressing ahead on a full scale with the deployment of the 'Patriot' missiles in South Korea, as part of their attempts to overpower the DPRK militarily.

"Nobody in the world will believe that the United States has the intention to resolve the issue, as the United States launches smile diplomacy at the negotiation table, as if it were interested in the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons, while frantically engaged in the deployment of its missiles to be trained on the other dialogue party from behind the scenes.

"This notwithstanding, the United States State Department spokesman's sophistry that the deployment of the United States missiles can in no way be considered provocative to the DPRK is really the height of impudence.

"The United States new war machinations do not stop here.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"The United States Administration sent the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to South Korea in the early days of the new year for a huddle on the 'greater intelligence activities vis-à-vis North Korea' - a strong indication of the full-scale stage of the war preparations.

"It is not difficult now to guess that the United States will move to contrive pretexts for a shift to real military actions.

"In the light of this, it has become clear to anyone that the IAEA secretariat has intentionally delayed consultations with us until the films and batteries of the surveillance cameras installed at the DPRK's nuclear facilities will have run out, and now begun attempting full-scope inspections in an intriguing manner, and that these moves have been made in pursuit of the calculated stratagem of the United States.

"All the facts clearly show that the United States has no intention at all to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula peacefully but still remains unchanged as ever in its ulterior objectives to strangle the DPRK by force at any cost.

"With regard to the current crisis due to the despicable and dangerous actions of perfidy on the part of the United States, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea solemnly declares its position as follows:

"First, if the United States defiantly goes ahead and reverses the promise it has made to the DPRK, the DPRK will no longer be bound by the promise it has made to the United States.

"The DPRK's promise to the United States includes all the goodwill measures and commitments it has taken so far unilaterally for the continued DPRK/United States talks and for a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, such as the suspension of the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from the NPT, the freeze of all nuclear activities and the declared intention to renounce the graphite-moderated reactor system.

"Second, if the United States has no intention to hold any further round of talks, the DPRK, too, will have no intention to do so.

"It will be a gross miscalculation if the United States considers the DPRK/United States talks as an offering to the DPRK.

"The DPRK has consistently called for negotiations with the United States since the first days of the origination of the nuclear issue, in order to peacefully resolve the issue, not to seek any benefit from the United States.

"We have so far lived on our own without any relations with the United States, we can live well on our own in the future, too, and we have become constitutionally adapted to such a life.

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

"Third, if the United States decides to take other options, we will also take our own countermeasures.

"In no way does the right of choice belong to big countries only."

This is the content of the statement of the spokesman of DPRK's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): We have just heard the statement by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. This statement prompts me to make two comments, the first in my capacity as President and the second in my capacity as national representative.

As President, I would like to recall here forcefully that the Conference on Disarmament is a multilateral body for the negotiation of disarmament measures and not a forum to make unfounded accusations or engage in uncalled-for bilateral invective. All this severely tries everyone's patience, particularly that of the President. I would therefore appeal to the sense of restraint of certain participants to maintain the dignity of our work and the character of our Conference. This will be the last warning I will issue as President; such an attitude will not be tolerated in the future.

In my capacity as representative of France, I cannot allow the remarks made by the representative of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea to go without comment, since he mentioned my country at the beginning of his statement, in addition to the United States. My delegation has many times had occasion to reiterate its position on the issue of the need for North Korea to abide by its international commitments, particularly the application of IAEA safeguards in accordance with the commitments it has entered into. These commitments have been clearly defined by the Board of Governors of IAEA, the General Conference of IAEA and the United Nations Security Council, on behalf of the international community as a whole. In other words, it is unacceptable for us to hear anyone challenge the impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its secretariat, when all countries acknowledge the exemplary nature of the Agency's activities. Nor is it acceptable to reduce this matter to a bilateral quarrel or a regional issue. As we have already had occasion to say twice, and have also said in this forum, because it has to do with respect for an international standard, this issue concerns us all. Therefore only respect by North Korea for its commitments, duly acknowledged by IAEA, will be capable of satisfying the international community. That is the end of the statement I wished to make in my capacity as representative of France.

We have thus reached the end of the list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see that none does. I now invite the Conference to turn to the question of the appointment of the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and special coordinators on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the expansion of the membership of the Conference,

(The President)

and the agenda of the Conference. I am pleased to be able to announce that the particularly intensive consultations which I conducted on these matters have produced the following proposals, which I now put before the Conference.

I propose that Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico should take the Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I propose that Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany should take the Chair of the Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. May I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I propose that Ambassador György Boytha of Hungary should be appointed Chairman of the Committee on Transparency in Armaments. May I take it that the Conference accepts this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I now come to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I understand that the Group of 21 will be putting forward a candidate for this post in the next few days, and I hope that the Conference will be able to make the appointment at our next plenary meeting.

I also propose that Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada should be appointed special coordinator in charge of seeking the views of members on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I also propose that Ambassador Lars Norberg of Sweden should be appointed special coordinator on the issue of the Conference's agenda. May I take it that the Conference decides to accept this proposal?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Lastly, on the subject of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, as the Conference will recall, we had also decided to designate a special coordinator. In the meantime the representative of Mexico placed a proposal before the Conference at its first

(The President)

plenary meeting. It would therefore seem desirable for the Conference to take a certain amount of time before it decides on this proposal. It is therefore my intention to begin consideration of the Mexican proposal as of tomorrow in the consultations I will hold with the group coordinators and China at 3.30 p.m. in the secretariat conference room on the sixth floor. Hence it seems reasonable to me, since it is a question of appointing a special coordinator on this issue, to take a decision only after this period of reflection, which means, if you are agreeable, on 10 February at the latest.

I would like to convey my heartfelt congratulations to the chairmen of the ad hoc committees and the special coordinators whom we have just appointed and wish them every success in their work. I would also like to express here my warm thanks to all the delegations for their flexibility and the spirit of compromise they have demonstrated during the intensive consultations which have enabled us to plan a speedy start to our substantive work. I intend to hold a meeting very shortly with the ad hoc committee chairmen and special coordinators to consider with them the timetable for future meetings, which I hope to put before the Conference as soon as possible. At this stage Ambassador Marín Bosch has asked me to inform the Conference that he intends to hold his first organizational meeting on Thursday, 3 February at 3.30 p.m. in this room.

We have now reached the end of our agenda for today. Is there any delegation wishing to take the floor at this stage? I give the floor to Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The chairmen of the ad hoc committees do not usually speak in this Conference on the very day of their appointment. However, I would like to say a few words on the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. I shall not try to conceal the pleasure that I feel at this appointment. As I had occasion to say at our inaugural meeting a week ago, Mexico has been a tireless promoter of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. As a student of Alfonso García Robles and Luis Padilla Nervo, this appointment has very special significance for us. At the first meeting of the Ad Hod Committee, which will take place on Thursday, 3 February in the afternoon, as you announced, I will invite the members and observers of this Conference to engage in an intensive dialogue with a view to expediting our work on this topic of key importance for all of us. This dialogue will be designed to bring about agreement on the provisions of the future treaty. To use the English expression, it will be a "treaty-specific" dialogue. I would also like to place on record our appreciation for the results achieved in the Ad Hoc Committee in 1993 under the guidance of Ambassador Tanaka. Allow me to conclude by thanking the members of the Conference, and very specially my colleagues in the Group of 21, for their solidarity and support.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Ambassador of Mexico for his statement. If no other delegation wishes to take the floor, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 February 1994 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.